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THE ALIEN'S RIGHT TO WORK
By DAvID FE-LLMAN*
I. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND THE ALIEN
T HE alien population of the United States, it is now dear, is
declining rapidly. According to the census of 1920, the alien
population of the country was 7,430,809; the census of 1930 put
the figure at 6,284,613-',, and the department of labor estimated
our total alien population in 1936 to be about 4,316,000.1 This
decline may be explained in terms of several rather obvious
factors. For one thing, under the double impact of our quota
restrictions and the depression, fewer immigrants are coming to
the United States; the 23,068 immigrants admitted for permanent
residence in 1933 marked the lowest figure recorded in a hundred
years.2 Furthermore, the tide is now running out; in recent years,
emigrants abandoning domicile and leaving this country with no
intention of returning have outnumbered immigrants admitted.-
Finally, there has been a sharp increase in the number of aliens
seeking naturalization.4 The rush for citizenship papers is prob-
ably due, to a great extent, to the economic disqualifications of
alienage, and to a general anti-alien sentiment in this country
*Instructor in Political Science, University of Nebraska.
11936 Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor 89.
21935 Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor 78. In 1934, 29,470
immigrants were admitted for permanent residence, in 1935, 34,956. In
1936, 36,329 were admitted. 1936 Report, 93.
3'During the 6-year period 1931-36 immigration has totaled only 256,538
and emigration 359,680, a difference of 103,142 on the side of emigration."
1936 Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor 89. See Woofter, Jr., Races
and Ethnic Groups in American Life, chs. I-InI; Fields, America's Emi-
grants, (1936) 45 Current History 59.
4In 1936, 148,118 declarations of intention and 167,127 petitions for
citizenship were filed, and 141,265 certificates of naturalization were issued.
The figures for 1933 show: 83,046 declarations of intention, 112,629 petitions
for citizenship, and 113,363 certificates of naturalization. 1936 Annual
Report of the Secretary of Labor 90.
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which the depression has unquestionably .intensified.' In spite of
the fact that the alien population of the country is shrinking, the
legal status of the alien, particularly in reference to his right to
work for a living, grows steadily more precarious. In fact, the
recent flood of legislation in the states barring aliens from an ever
wider field of economic activity gives the problem a touch of
urgency.
That the alien has a legal status, and is not helplessly at the
mercy of legislative and administrative caprice, is found in con-
sidering the body of law which has developed in reference to the
exclusion and deportation of aliens. It is a well-established prin-
ciple of international law that a sovereign nation has the right, by
virtue of its sovereignty, to exclude or expel any classes of aliens
it considers undesirable. 6 The federal government, having charge
of foreign affairs under our constitutional distribution of powers,
has long exercised this right of sovereignty.7 Thus, in the leading
5See Adamic, Aliens and Alien-Baiters, (1936) 173 Harpers 561; Irwin,
The Pleasures of Hate, (1936) 25 Survey Graphic 368; Bremer, The Jobless
Alien, (1930) 65 Survey 316; Young, American Minority Peoples, chs. III
and IV; Hearings on Citizen Employment before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on Labor, H. of R., 74th Congr. 2nd sess., on H. R. 12662,
May 15, 1936. In the department's report for 1935, pp. 81-82, the secretary
of labor wrote: "It is probable that the causes of this increase are largely
economic. Aliens are commonly barred from employment on public works,
private employers in increasing numbers prefer hiring citi ens, proposals
are frequently advanced for excluding aliens from relief rolls, only citizens
can qualify for old age pensions and other benefits under social security
laws."
6Vattel, Law of Nations, 6th Am. ed., 107; 4 Moore, Dig. Int. Law 67;
1 Kent, Comm., 12th ed., 35; 2 Wharton, Dig. Int. Law 516; Taylor,
Int. Pub. Law, sec. 186.
TAs a general rule, the states may not interfere with or supplement
federal immigration policy. Chy Lung v. Freeman, (1875) 92 U. S. 275,
23 L. Ed. 550; In re Ah Fong, (C.C. Cal. 1874) 3 Sawy. 144, Fed. Cas.
no. 102 (state may not exclude immigrants on grounds of immorality);
People v. Compagnie G~n6rale Transatlantique, (1882) 107 U. S. 59, 2
Sup. Ct. 87, 27 L. Ed. 383; Passenger Cases, (1849) 7 How. (U.S.) 283, 12
L. Ed. 702; Henderson v. Mayor of New York, (1876) 92 U. S. 259, 23
L. Ed. 543 (state may not impose tax on alien immigrants). But state regu-
lation under the police power is valid, until displaced by an Act of Congress,
where the subject matter does not require uniformity of treatment, as in the
case of quarantine laws, Morgan's Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Brd. of
Health, (1886) 118 U. S. 455, 6 Sup. Ct. 1114, 30 L. Ed. 237; Compagnie
Francaise v. Louisiana Brd. of Health, (1902) 186 U. S. 380, 22 Sup. Ct.
811, 46 L. Ed. 1175, pilotage regulations, Cooley v. Board of Wardens,
(1851) 12 How. (U.S.) 299, 13 L. Ed. 996, or the registration of aliens,
New York v. Miln, (1837) 11 Pet. (U.S.) 102, 9 L. Ed. 648. As Mr.
Justice Field wrote in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, (1889) 130 U. S.
581, 606, 9 Sup. Ct. 623, 32 L. Ed. 1068, Chinese Exclusion Case: "For
local interests the several States of the Union exist, but for national
purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are one poeple,
one nation, one power."
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case of Fong Yu- Ting v. United States," the Supreme Court
asserted that the right to exclude or expel any class of aliens, in
war or peace is, "an inherent and inalienable right of every
sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety, its inde-
pendence and its welfare." Mr. Justice Gray wrote that "if it
could not exclude aliens it would be, to that extent, subject to the
control of a foreign power."9 In the assertion of this inherent
power of self-preservation, Congress is free to choose whatever
methods it desires to carry out its policies, for questions arising
from our external relations fall within the familiar category of
political questions, in the handling of which the courts are loath
to interfere.' The power of the national government in this
field of activity is not only reserved for the political departments
of the government, but it is a plenary, expansive power as well."1
In the execution of this governmental power, Congress has
enacted a great deal of legislation providing for the exclusion and
deportation of many classes of aliens which, in its judgment, are
undesirable: the mentally unfit, paupers, diseased and immoral
persons, criminals, contract laborers, illiterates and Asiatics."
8(1893) 149 U. S. 698, 13 Sup. Ct. 1016, 37 L. Ed. 905.
9Cf. Tiaco v. Forbes, (1913) 228 U. S. 549, 33 Sup. Ct. 585, 57 L. Ed.
960, dealing with the inherent power of the Philippine Islands to exclude
a Chinese alien. See also Chinese Exclusion Case, (1889) 130 U. S.
581, 603, 9 Sup. Ct. 623, 32 L. Ed. 1068.
loUnited States v. Palmer, (1818) 3 Wheat. (U.S.) 610, 4 L. Ed.
471; Foster v. Neilson, (1829) 2 Pet. (U.S.) 253, 7 L. Ed. 415; Terlinden
v. Ames, (1902) 184 U. S. 270, 22 Sup. Ct. 484, 46 L. Ed. 534; Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., (1918) 246 U. S. 297, 38 Sup. Ct. 309, 62 L. Ed. 726;
United States ex. rel. Boynton v. Blaine, (1891) 139 U. S. 306, 11 Sup.
Ct. 607, 35 L. Ed. 183; Neely v. Henkel, (1901) 180 U. S. 109, 21 Sup.
Ct. 302, 45 L. Ed. 448. See 3 Willoughby, Constitutional Law, 2d ed.,
1326-1338; Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts,
(1924) 8 MINNESOTA LAw REvimw 485; Potter, The Political Question in
International Law in the Courts of the United States, (1927) 8 South-
western Pol. and Soc. Sci. Q. 127; Dodd, Judicially Non-enforceable Pro-
visions of Constitutions, (1931) 80 U. Pa.'L. Rev. 54; Finkelstein, Judicial
Self-limitation, (1923) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 338.
"Missouri v. Holland, (1920) 252 U. S. 416, 40 Sup. Ct. 382, 64
L, Ed. 641 (protection of migratory birds); United States v. Ariona,
(1887) 120 U. S. 479, 7 Sup. Ct. 628, 30 L. Ed. 728 (punishment of
counterfeiters of foreign currency); Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
(1893) 149 U. S. 698, 13 Sup. Ct. 1016, 37 L. Ed. 905, (deportation of
orientals); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., (1936) 299
U. S. 304, 57 Sup. Ct. 216 (prohibition against sale of arms to foreign
belligerents); Jones v. United States, (1890) 137 U. S. 202, 11 Sup. Ct.
80, 34 L. Ed. 691 (acquisition of territory). See Boyd, The Expanding
Treaty Power, (1928) 6 N.C.L. Rev. 428; Stoke, The Constitution and the
International Labor Conventions, (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 531; Kuhn, The
Treaty-Making Power and the Reserved Sovereignty of the States, (1907)
7 Col. L. Rev. 172.
l2For an exhaustive review of this legislation, see the admirable study
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Going to the margin of the exertion by Congress of its constitu-
tional power, the courts have interpreted the statutes to warrant
the deportation of aliens on the grounds of mere belief in a
doctrine, such as "philosophical anarchism."' 3
For the enforcement of these laws, Congress is not required
to prescribe all the legal niceties of procedure which due process
of law requires in domestic affairs. Deportation is not a criminal
proceeding, and an order of expulsion is not a sentence of punish-
ment; it is therefore proper to provide for a completely administra-
tive process, without recourse to the courts.4 This is in accord
with the familiar doctrine that due process of law does not
necessarily require judicial process. 15 Thus, there is no impro-
priety in stipulating that the findings of administrative officials
with respect to the fact of alienage shall be final, for in the
language-of Mr. Justice Holmes, "the requirement of a judicial
trial does not prevail in every case."'8 Indeed, the exclusion of
an alien by administrative process alone, without judicial review,
is applicable to one who had acquired a commercial domicile within
the United States, but who voluntarily left the country, although
for a temporary purpose, for "he is none the less an alien."'
of Van Vleck, The Administrative Control of Aliens. See also, Klainer,
Deportation of Aliens, (1935) 15 B. U. L. Rev. 663; The Alien Deportation
Controversy in Congress, (1935) 14 Congr. Dig., No. 11; Bouv6, Exclu-
sion and Expulsion of Aliens.
13United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, (1904) 194 U. S. 279, 24
Sup. Ct. 719, 48 L. Ed. 979; Lopez v. Howe, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1919) 259 Fed.
401; Ex parte Pettine, (D.C. Mass. 1919) 259 Fed. 733; Ex parte
Caminita, (D.C. N.Y. 1922) 291 Fed. 913. Cf. Skeffington v. Katzeff,
(C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1922) 277 Fed. 129 (deportation of Communists). See
Note, Right of the United States to Deport Aliens on the Ground of
Anarchical Teachings, (1919) 6 Va. L. Rev. 201; Comment, Deportation of
Alien Communists, (1921) 30 Yale L. J. 625.
14Fong Yue Ting v. United States, (1893) 149 U. S. 698, 13 Sup. Ct.
1016, 37 L. Ed. 905; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, (1892) 142 U. S.
651, 12 Sup. Ct. 336, 35 L. Ed. 1146; United States v. Ju Toy, (1905)
198 U. S. 253, 25 Sup. Ct. 644, 49 L. Ed. 1040; Zakonaite v. Wolf, (1912)
226 U. S. 272, 33 Sup. Ct. 31, 57 L. Ed. 218; Choy Gum v. Backus,
(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1915) 223 Fed. 487.
15Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., (1855) 18 How.
(U.S.) 272, 15 L. Ed. 372; Springer v. United States, (1880) 102 U. S.
586, 26 L. Ed. 253; Lawton v. Steele, (1894) 152 U. S. 133, 14 Sup. Ct. 499.
38 L. Ed. 385; Reetz v. Michigan, (1903) 188 U. S. 505, 23 Sup. Ct. 390,
47 L. Ed. 563; Public Clearing House v. Coyne, (1904) 194 U. S. 497,
24 Sup. Ct. 789, 48 L. Ed. 1092; North American Cold Storage Co. v.
Chicago, (1908) 211 U. S. 306, 29 Sup. Ct. 101, 53 L. Ed. 195. See
Tollefson, Administrative Finality, (1931) 29 Mich. L. Rev. 839.
'6United States v. Ju Toy, (1905) 198 U. S. 253, 263, 25 Sup. Ct.
644, 49 L. Ed. 1040; United States v. Sing Tuck, (1904) 194 U. S. 161,
24 Sup. Ct. 621, 48 L. Ed. 917.
17Lem Moon Sing v. United States, (1895) 158 U. S. 538, 547, 15
Sup. Ct. 967, 39 L. Ed. 1082. See Bouv6, The Immigration Act'and
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Furthermore, the technical legal rules of evidence do not apply
in full force to hearings conducted by administrative officers in
executing the exclusion and deportation laws.", Irregularities in
the warrant of arrest will not invalidate the proceedings;" the
hearing is proper even if the notice given was not formal, and the
alien claimed he did not understand the language or meaning of
the notice ;20 formal pleadings are not required ;21 the alien is not
entitled to trial by jury;- it is not improper to hold the hearing
in a penitentiary;23 the admission of hearsay evidence is not
objectionable ;21 nor is due process lacking because .the alien could
not secure the compulsory attendance of witnesses ;" statements
made voluntarily to officers before or after arrest are admissible,"6
and it is proper to draw an inference of undesirability from the
failure of the alien to answer questions ;27 the administrative
appeal may be concluded very quickly.2 8 Thus, our law admits
of a great deal of informality and flexibility in the conduct of
these cases by administrative officials.2 9
In spite of all this, however, the alien is not subject to an
arbitrary administrative procedure, and the courts have been
willing, in many cases, to impose restraints where the general prin-
ciples of fairness required by due process of law have been ignored
or violated.30 The Supreme Court has emphasized the fact that
while these are not criminal proceedings, they must be
Returning Resident Aliens, (1911) 59 U. Pa. L. Rev. 359. Cf. Lees v.
United States, (1893) 150 U. S. 476, 14 Sup. Ct. 155, 37 L. Ed. 1148.
1SBilokumsky v. Tod, (1923) 263 U. S. 149, 44 Sup. Ct. 382, 64 L Ed.
641; United States ex rel. Georgian v. Uhl, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1921) 271
Fed. 676; Svarney v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 515.
19Kush v. Davis, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1924) 3 F. (2d) 273; Ex parte
Harnaguchi. (C.C. Or. 1908) 161 Fed. 185.20The Japanese Immigrant Case, (1903) 189 U. S. 86, 23 Snp. Ct.
611, 47 L. Ed. 721.21United States ex rel. Reinmann v. Martin, (D.C. N.Y. 1912) 193
Fed. 795.
s2Zakonaite v. Wolf, (1912) 226 U. S. 272, 33 Sup. Ct. 31, 57 L Ed.
218. 23Rousseau v. Weedin, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1922) 284 Fed. 565.
24Morrell v. Baker, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1920) 270 Fed. 577; United
States ex rel. Ross v. Wallis, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1922) 279 Fed. 401.
25Low Wah Suey v. Backus, (1912) 225 U. S. 460, 32 Sup. Ct. 734, 56
L. Ed. 1165.
26United States v. Hung Chang, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1904) 134 Fed. 19.
27Mahler v. Eby, (1924) 264 U. S. 32, 44 Sup. Ct. 283, 68 L Ed. 549.
28Tang Tun v. Edsell, (1912) 223 U. S. 673, 32 Sup. Ct. 359, 56 L Ed.
606. 2 9It may be noted that, in general, the English courts require even less
of an adherence to traditional rules of legal procedure. See collection of
cases in Frankfurter and Davison, Cases on Administrative Law 1016-1044.
3oConsult: Powell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Immi-
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"administered, not arbitrarily and secretly, but fairly and openly,
under the restraints of the tradition and principles of free govern-
ment applicable where the fundamental rights of men are in-
volved, regardless of their origin or race."
'31
Thus, many federal courts have commented on the despotic powers
of the administrative agent who is at the same time "informer,
arresting officer, inquisitor, and judge, ' 32 and have insisted that
due process of law requires that the alien have a fair opportunity to
present his case in a fair hearing. 3 A fair hearing includes the
right to have the benefit of counsel,3 4 and the right of cross-
examination. 5 In deportation cases, the alien is entitled to the
constitutional protection against illegal searches and seizures.30
In the trenchant language of Judge Anderson, "a mob is a mob,
whether made up of government officials acting under instructions
from the department of justice, or of criminals, loafers, and the
vicious classes. '37 Nor may an official extort a confession. 8  A
gration Proceedings, (1909) 22 Harv. L. Rev. 360; Bevis, The Deporta-
tion of Aliens, (1920) 68 U. Pa. L. Rev. 97; Note, Due Process Restrictions
on Procedure in Alien Exclusion and Deportation Cases, (1931) 31 Col. L.
Rev. 1013; Fugina, Fair Hearing in Deportation Proceedings, (1927) 4
Wisc. L. Rev. 217; Report on the Enforcement of the Deportation Laws
of the United States, National Committee on Law Observance and Enforce-
ment (Washington, 1931); Van Vleck, The Administrative Control of
Aliens, ch. 5; Levandoski, Citizenship and Deportation, (1929) 5 Notre
Dame Lawyer 81.31Kwock Jan Fat v. White, (1920) 253 U. S. 454, 464, 40 Sup. Ct.
566, 64 L. Ed. 1010.
32United States ex rel. Bosny v. Williams, (D.C. N.Y. 1911) 185
Fed. 598, 599.
ZaThe Japanese Immigrant Case, (1903) 189 U. S. 86, 23 Sup. Ct.
611, 47 L. Ed. 721; Chin Yow v. United States, (1908) 208 U. S. 8, 28
Sup. Ct. 201, 52 L. Ed. 369; Tod v. Waldman, (1924) 266 U. S. 113,
45 Sup. Ct. 85, 69 L. Ed. 195; In re Osterloh, (D.C. Tex. 1929) 34 F.
(2d) 223; United States ex rel. Iorio v. Day, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1929) 34
F. (2d) 920; United States ex rel. Bosny v. Williams, (D.C. N.Y. 1911)
185 Fed. 598; Ex parte Petkos, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1914) 212 Fed. 275; Ex
parte Radivoeff, (D.C. Mont. 1922) 278 Fed. 227; Ungar v. Seaman,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1924) 4 F. (2d) 80; Ex parte Hidekuni Iwata, (D.C.
Cal. 1915) 219 Fed. 610; United States ex rel. Huber v. Sibray, (C.C. Pa.
1910) 178 Fed. 150.34United States ex rel. Bosny v. Williams, (D.C. N.Y. 1911) 185
Fed. 598; Maltez v. Nagle, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1928) 27 F. (2d) 835; Whitfield
v. Hanges, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1915) 222 Fed. 745. The alien is also entitled
to have a well-qualified interpreter, Gonzales v. Zurbrick, (C.C.A. 6th
Cir. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 934.
83Svarney v. United States. (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 515;
In re Sugano, (D.C. Calif. 1930) 40 F. (2d) 961.
SeColyer v. Skeffington, (D.C. Mass. 1920) 265 Fed. 17; Ex parte
Jackson, (D.C. Mont. 1920) 263 Fed. 110; Bilokumsky v. Tod. (1923) 263
U. S. 149, 44 Sup. Ct. 54, 68 L. Ed. 221; United States v. Wong Quong
Wong, (D.C. Vt. 1899) 94 Fed. 832.
8TColyer v. Skeffington, (D.C. Mass. 1920) 265 Fed. 17, 43.
3$Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, (1924) 266 U. S. 1, 45 Sup. Ct.
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resident alien cannot be taken into custody without a warrant,89
and failure to show, to an alien or his counsel, the warrant of
arrest or the papers on which it was issued, will make the hearing
irregular.
40
Furthermore, an alien who is being held by immigration officers
for deportation is in custody under or by color of the authority
of the United States, and he therefore has a right to apply in a
federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. 4' While the alien
does not become entitled to a judicial review of the administrative
finding by merely asserting the possession of citizenship, if he
can set up a real and serious claim to citizenship he ought to be
able to get a judicial determination of the claim.42 If the question
is one of law and not of fact, a judicial question exists.'3 And, of
course, the interpretation given to a statute by an administrative
official is always subject to judicial review." Thus, for example,
aliens may be excluded on grounds of moral turpitude, and the
courts have frequently revised the administrative estimate of what
constitutes moral turpitude.?' It may be noted, further, that
while an alien may be deported by administrative process, if the
offense of remaining here illegally is made punishable by imprison-
ment a judicial trial must be provided for, in accordance with the
fifth and sixth amendments.
46
"It is not consistent with the theory of our government," Mr.
1, 69 L. Ed. 131; Jouras v. Allen, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1915) 222 Fed. 756.39United States ex rel. Fink v. Tad, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1924) 1 F.
(2d) 246; United States ex rel. Murphy v. McCandless, (D.C. Pa. 1930)
40 F. (2d) 643.
4OEx parte Avakian, (D.C. Mass. 1910) 188 Fed. 688.
4lUnited States v. Jung Ah Lung, (1888) 124 U. S. 621, 8 Sup. Ct.
663, 31 L. Ed. 591.2 Ng Fung Ho v. White, (1922) 259 U. S. 276, 42 Sup. Ct. 492, 66
L. Ed. 938.
43Gonzales v. Williams, (1904) 192 U. S. 1, 24 Sup. Ct. 177, 48 L. Ed.
317.
44Gegiow v. Uhl, (1915) 239 U. S. 3, 36 Sup. Ct. 2, 60 L. Ed. 114.
45In many cases the administrative judgment was held to be incorrect,
as in: Lewis v. Frick, (C.C. Mich. 1911) 189 Fed. 146 (disorderly conduct);
Ex parte Edmead, (D.C. Mass. 1928) 27 F. (2d) 438 (petty larceny);
Ex parte Saraceno, (D.C. N.Y. 1910) 182 Fed. 955 (carrying concealed
weapon) ; Ciambelli ex rel. Maranci v. Johnson, (D.C. Mass. 1926) 12
F. (2d) 465 (assault and battery); Coykendall v. Skrmetta, (C.C.A. 5th
Cir. 1927) 22 F. (2d) 120 (manufacture of intoxicating liquor for private
consumption) ; United States v. Sibray, (C.C. Pa. 1910) 178 Fed. 144.
rev'd on other grounds, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1911) 185 Fed. 401 (single immoral
act); United States v. Uhl, (D.C. N.Y. 1913) 203 Fed. 152, afFd
(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1914) 210 Fed. 860 (criminal libel against foreign poten-
tate).
48Wong Wing v. United States, (1896) 163 U. S. 228, 16 Sup. Ct.
977, 41 L. Ed. 140.
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Justice Shiras wrote, "that the legislature should, after having
defined an offense as an infamous crime, find the fact of guilt and
adjudge the punishment by one of its own agents." '
The courts also have applied the familiar doctrine that while they
will not pass on the weight of the evidence gathered by the in-
spectors, it must be clear that the evidence colorably supports
the result.
41
The powers of the federal government in respect to foreign
or external affairs are admittedly very great. In the field of
foreign relations, the federal government possesses all the attri-
butes of sovereignty, enjoying a plenary jurisdiction in respect
to ends and means, however limited its jurisdiction may be in the
realm of domestic affairs. Indeed, in the recent arms embargo
case, the Supreme Court declared that if the powers to declare and
wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, and to maintain
diplomatic relations with other nations had not been mentioned
in the constitution, they "would have vested in the federal govern-
ment as necessary concomitants of nationality.14 And yet, in exe-
cuting these great powers, the agents of the federal government are
required by the courts to observe well-recognized standards of
legal fair play. For the sovereign is not only restrained by the
sheer fact that there are other sovereignties whose nationals must
be treated fairly as a matter of international comity; it has also
created effective judicial agencies to correct abuses which arise
in the execution of valid powers of government. In short, in a
civilized world of civilized nations aliens have rights; they are
not the helpless pawns of unrestrained sovereigns.
II. A GENERAL VIEW OF THE ALIEN'S RIGHTS
What is the general status of the alien who is legally within
the country?" Broadly speaking, the alien who resides here owes
a temporary and local allegiance, and is entitled to the protection of
4TWong Wing v. United States, (1896) 163 U. S. 228, 237, 16 Sup.
Ct. 977, 41 L. Ed. 140.
48United States ex rel. Papa v. Day, (D.C. N.Y. 1930) 45 F. (2d)
435; United States ex rel. Fong Lung Sing, (D.C. N.Y. 1928) 29 F. (2d)
619; (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1930) 37 F. (2d)'36; United States v. Lui Lihn,
(D.C. Ida. 1933) 4 Fed. Supp. 873.
49United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., (1936) 299 U. S.
304, 317, 57 Sup. Ct. 216, Sutherland, J.
5oSee Alexander, The Rights of Aliens under the Federal Constitution;
MacClintock. Aliens under the Federal Laws of the United States; Bailey,
Rights and Duties of Aliens within National Boundaries, (1927) 15 Ky.
L. J. 196.
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the law."' A characteristic expression of this point of view is
found in the following statement by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller:
"By general international law, foreigners who have become
domiciled in a country other than their own, acquire rights and
must discharge duties in many respects the same as possessed by
and imposed upon the citizens of that country, and no restriction
on the footing upon which such persons stand by reason of their
domicil of choice, or commercial domicil, is to be presumed . .. "I
Aliens residing in the United States are "bound to obey all the
laws of the country, not immediately relating to citizenship, dur-
ing their sojourn in it," and they are "equally amenable with
citizens for any infraction of those laws."' 3  Thus, they are
fully responsible for violating our criminal codes, for it is their
responsibility to obey the law.
5 4
Among other responsibilities falling upon the alien is the
obligation to pay taxes, for, as a general rule, citizenship is not
necessary for taxation, since the criterion is residence and not
personal allegiance. 5 A resident alien is entitled to equal taxation,
and accordingly a poll tax levied on resident aliens but not on
resident citizens has been held to be a denial of the equal pro-
tection of the laws.5 8 This rule, however, so far as the few
cases on the subject indicate, has not been applied too rigorously.
Thus, a $10 fee for the disinterment and removal of a dead body
has been upheld on the ground that the statute was general in
its terms, operating upon aliens and citizens alike, the court
arguing that' if the tax affected a larger number of Chinese
5 1The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, (1812) 7 Cranch (U.S.) 116,
144, 3 L. Ed. 287; Carlisle v. United States, (1873) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 147,
154, 21 L. Ed. 426. The court said in Fisher v. Fielding, (1895) 67 Conn.
91, 104, 34 Ad. 714; "An alien friend, however transient his presence may
be, is entitled to a temporary protection, and owes in return a temporary
allegiance." See also Luke v. Calhoun County, (1875) 52 Ala. 115.
52Lau Ow Bew v. United States, (1892) 144 U. S. 47, 62, 12 Sup. Ct.
517, 36 L. Ed. 340.
53Carlisle v. United States, (1873) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 147, 154, 21 L. Ed.
426. 54Mali v. Keeper of the Common Jail, (1887) 120 U. S. 1. 7 Sup. Ct.
385, 30 L. Ed. 565. In the famous case of People v. McLeod, (1841) 1
Hill (N.Y.) 377, 25 Wend. (N.Y.) 483, 37 Am. Dec. 328, Judge Cowen
wrote: "An alien, in whatever manner he may have entered our territory,
is, if he commit a crime while here, amenable to our criminal law ...
Nay, says Locke, though he were an Indian, and never heard of our laws."
People v. McLeod, (1841) 1 Hill (N.Y.) 377, 406-07, 25 Wend. (N.Y.)
483, 37 Am. Dec. 328.
5*.Pendleton v. Commonwealth, (1909) 110 Va. 229, 65 S. E. 536;
Kuntz v. Davidson County, (1880) 6 Lea (Tenn.) 65.
5"Ex parte Kotta, (1921) 187 Cal. 27, 200 Pac. 957. A nondiscrimina-
tory poll tax is valid when levied on a nondeclarant resident alien. Kuntz
v. Davidson County, (1880) 6 Lea (Tenn.) 65.
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than any other class, that was due to the peculiar customs of the
Chinese and not to any legal discrimination. 7 Furthermore, the
states may discriminate against non-resident alien beneficiaries, by
assessing higher inheritance taxes against them than against resi-
dents,5 8 although this power of discrimination may be limited
by treaty. 59
Whether aliens may be compelled to perform military service
goes to the margin of the law. The general common-law rule is
that an alien is exempt from military service,60 although resident
declarants have been held subject to such service.0 ' An alien who
voluntarily enlists in the army has no right later to claim exemption
from the consequences of his own voluntary engagement because
of his alienage, even though the act of Congress provided for
the enlistment of citizens only."2 Under the Selective Service Act
of May 18, 1917, a resident non-declarant alien was not subject
to military service if he claimed exemption, but it was held that
such an alien was subject to the draft if he did not claim the
$
71n re Wong Yung Quy, (C.C. Calif. 1880) 2 Fed. 624.5sMager v. Grima, (1850) 8 How. (U.S.) 490, 12 L. Ed. 581; Suc-
cession of Sala, (1897) 50 La. Ann. 1009, 24 So. 674; Moody v. Hagen,
(1917) 36 N. D. 471, 162 N. W. 707, L. R. A. 1918F 947, Ann. Cas. 1918A
933, aff'd mem. (1917) 245 U. S. 633, 38 Sup. Ct. 133, 62 L. Ed. 522; City
Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Bowers, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1934) 68 F. (2d) 909.
Cf. State v. Travelers' Ins. Co., (1898) 70 Conn. 590, 40 Atd. 465. See
Angell, The Nonresident Alien: A Problem in Federal Taxation of
Income, (1936) 36 Col. L. Rev. 908.
59in re Estate of Moynihan, (1915) 172 Iowa 571, 151 N. W. 504,
L. R. A. 1916D 1127; In re Estate of Stixrud, (1910) 58 Wash. 339, 109
Pac. 343, 33 L. R. A. (N.S.) 632, Ann. Cas. 1912A 850; McKeown v.
Brown, (1914) 167 Iowa 489, 149 N. W. 593; Peterson v. Iowa, (1917)
245 U. S. 170, 38 Sup. Ct. 109, 62 L. Ed. 225, aff'g (1914) 166 Iowa 617,
147 N. W. 1098, 52 L. R. A. (N.S.) 686; Duus v. Brown, (1917) 245
U. S. 176, 38 Sup. Ct. 111, 62 L. Ed. 228, aff'g (1915) 168 Iowa 511, 151
N. W. 66, L. R. A. 1916A 469. See Valiance, Exemption of Aliens from
Taxation, (1929) 23 Am. J. Int. Law -395.
60Jackson ex dem. Fitz Simmons v. Fitz Simmons, (1832) 10 Wend.
(N.Y.) 9, 24 Am. Dec. 198; In re Conway and Gibbons, (1863) 17 Wis.
543: ". . . No state can impose the rights and duties of citizenship upon
aliens who do not choose to have them." Cf. Sawyer v. Kropp, (1916)
115 L. T. N. S. 232, 14 Loc. Gov. Rep. 989.
81In re Wehlitz, (1863) 16 Wis. 443, 84 Am. Dec. 700. It was held
that a foreigner domiciled in Alabama was subject to military service
under the Confederate States. In re Pille, (1864) 39 Ala. 459; In re
Toner, (1864) 39 Ala. 454. But, if the foreigner had not established
domicile, and had specifically declared his intention of returning to his
native country, he was exempt. Ex parte Barton, (1864) 39 Ala. 452;
Ex Parte Blumer, (1865) 27 Tex. 734. Cf. In re Finley, (1863) 60 N. C.
191. 62United States v. Cottingham, (1843) 1 Rob. (Va.) 615, 40 Am. Dec.
710. The court argued that by accepting the alien, the government infer-
entially waived the requirement of citizenship, and further, that an enlist-
ment is not a contract, and is therefore not subject to ordinary contract law.
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exemption according to the established procedure, the exemption
not being automatic.8 3 But a provision of the Act requiring resi-
dent declarant aliens to serve in the army was sustained, even
though the provision was contrary to prior treaties and estab-
lished rules of international law.8' According to the Amendatory
Act of July 9, 1918, alien declarants could secure exemption by
withdrawing their declarations of intention, but it was provided
that they were subsequently to be barred from becoming citizens.
Many who claimed exemption from military service on the grounds
of alienage have been denied citizenship for that reason since the
World War."'
Along with his responsibilities, the alien has come to enjoy
many legal privileges. Thus, although national citizenship is
generally a prerequisite for voting,6 the states are free, so far as
the federal constitution is concerned, to extend to aliens the
privilege of voting.' Although no state now permits aliens to
vote, at one time as many as twenty-two states and territories
extended them this privilege.8 Of course, the fact that an alien
could 'vote did not establish national citizenship, the acquisition
of which depends upon the will of Congress. 69 With respect to
the privilege of holding public office, the situation is not so well
defined. Several courts have ruled that the holders of elective
public offices must be citizens, even in the absence of any specific
constitutional or statutory requirement of citizenship, upon the
-SEx parte Hutflis, (D.C. N.Y. 1917) 245 Fed. 798; United States
ex rel. Koopowitz v. Finley, (D.C. N.Y. 1917) 245 Fed. 871; Ex parte
Blazekovic, (1Y.C. Mich. 1918) 248 Fed. 327; United States ex rel.
Cubyluck v. Bell, (D.C. N.Y. 1917) 248 Fed. 995. Contra: Ex parte Beck.
(D.C. Mont. 1917) 245 Fed. 967.
64United States ex rel. Pfefer v. Bell, (D.C. N.Y. 1918) 248 Fed. 992;
Ex parte Larrucea, (D.C. Cal. 1917) 249 Fed. 981; Gazzola v. Command-
ing Officer, (D.C. N. Y. 1918) 248 Fed. 1001. It was held that the
declarant was subject to the draft, even if he was a native of Austria.
with whom we were at war. United States ex rel. Warm v. Bell, (D.C.
N.Y. 1918) 248 Fed. 1002; Halpern v. Commanding Officer, (D.C. N.Y.
1918) 248 Fed. 1003. In United States ex rel. Bartalini v. Mitchell, (D.C.
N.Y. 1918),248 Fed. 997, it was held that a declarant was subject to the
draft even if he had allowed seven years to lapse after filing his declaration
of intention, for, not having left the country, no presumption arises that he
resumed his old allegiance to a foreign power.
65See Note, Denial of Citizenship to Aliens Who Sought Exemption
from Military Service during War, (1925) 34 Yale L. J. 548.
68Cook v. State, (1891) 90 Tenn. 407, 16 S. W. 471, 13 L. R. A. 183.
8.7Dorsey v. Brigham, (1898) 177 Ill. 250, 52 N. E. 303, 69 Am. St. Rep.228.
6$See Aylsworth, Passing of Alien Suffrage, (1931) 25 Am. Poli. Sci.
Rev. 114. The last state to give up alien voting was Arkansas in 1926.
'9 City of Minneapolis v. Reum, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1893) 56 Fed. 576,
580; State ex rel. Thayer v. Boyd, (1891) 31 Neb. 382, 48 N. W. 739.
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basis of the general theory of popular government.' The Indiana
court recently held, however, that in such circumstances, an alien
may serve as a member of a city council, even though the right
to vote is restricted to citizens. 7 1 Furthermore, some courts have
ruled that although an alien may not hold a public office, he may
remove his alienage after the election, if this is accomplished
before the date when he must qualify for the office. 72 As a
general rule, aliens may not serve as jurors,7" although some states
permit declarants to do so. 74  The great weight of authority
holds that although alienage is good cause for challenge before
trial, it is too late to complain after trial and conviction, for the
defect is not considered fundamental."5
A brief examination of the alien's right to sue in the courts
will further illustrate his general status. As a rule, aliens, whether
resident or nonresident, may sue in court without special statutory
permission.76 An alien, Circuit Judge Woodbury has written,
"is not now regarded as 'the outside barbarian' he is considered
in China, and the struggle in all commercial countries for some
centuries, has been to enlarge his privileges and powers as to all
matters of property and trade .... Indeed, by the very nature of
our institutions encouraging emigration here and naturalization,
70State ex rel. Off v. Smith, (1861) 14 Wis. 539 (sheriff) ; Opinion of
the Justices, (1877) 122 Mass. 594 (member of state legislature). There
is always the question of what constitutes a public office. See People
ex rel. Attorney General v. Wheeler (1902) 136 Cal. 652, 69 Pac. 435
(alien may hold position of physician in county hospital, since it is not a
public office).
-Connell v. State, (1924) 196 Ind. 421, 144 N. E. 882.
72State ex rel. Perine v. Van Beek, (1893) 87 Iowa 569, 54 N. W. 525
(sheriff) ; State ex rel. Schuet v. Murray, (1871) 28 Wis. 96 (clerk of
county board). Contra: Taylor v. Sullivan, (1890) 45 Minn. 309, 47
N. W. 802, 11 L. R. A. 272.
7"Reich v. State, (1874) 53 Ga. 73, 21 Am. Rep. 265; People v. Barker,
(1886) 60 Mich. 277, 27 N. W. 539, 1 Am. St. Rep. 501; State v. Ah
Chew, (1881) 16 Nev. 50, 40 Am. Rep. 488; Hinton v. Hinton, (1928) 196
N. C. 341, 145 S. E. 615. This was the common law rule, I Chitty,
Criminal Law 307, 5 Bacon's Abr. 312, 3 Coke Inst. 34.
74 People v. Scott, (1885) 56 Mich. 154, 22 N. W. 274; State v.
Pagels, (1887) 92 Mo. 300, 4 S. W. 931; State v. Barrett, (1889) 40
Minn. 65, 41 N. W. 459; Abrigo v. State, (1890) 29 Tex. App. 143, 15
S. W. 408.
75Kohl v. Lehlback, (1895) 160 U. S. 293, 16 Sup. Ct. 304, 40 L. Ed.
432; Hollingsworth v. Duane, (1801) 4 DalI. (U.S.) 353, 1 L. Ed. 715;
State v. Quarrel, (1798) 2 Bay (S.C.L.) 150, 1 Am. Dec. 637; State v.
Vogel, (1868) 22 Wis. 471. Contra: Hill v. People, (1868) 16 Mich.
351; Johr v. People, (1873) 26 Mich. 427.
76Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, (1908) 208 U. S. 570, 578, 28
Sup. Ct. 337, 52 L. Ed. 625; Taylor v. Carpenter, (C.C. Mass. 1844) 3
Story 458, Fed. Cas. No. 13,784; Taylor v. Carpenter, (C.C. Mass. 1846)
2 Woodb. & M. 1, Fed. Cas. No. 13,785; Crashley v. Press Pub. Co., (1904)
179 N. Y. 27, 71 N. E. 258; Roberts v. Knights, (1863) 7 Allen (Mass.)
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and filling up our waste lands with the industrious of all nations,
a more liberal course has always been entertained here in respect
to foreigners than in England." 7
Nor does the right to sue depend upon the quality of justice
dispensed in the alien's home country. 8 "The cannibal of the
Fejees may sue here in a personal action, though having no courts
at home for us to resort to."1
79
In respect to workmen's compensation actions, it has been held
that an alien may sue for compensation," and that it is not contrary
to public policy to permit nonresident alien dependents to receive
benefits.81 It is clear that resident aliens may bring actions for
damages, under a statute authorizing suit for damages due to
injuries causing death (Lord Campbell's Act).6 - Indeed, it may
be noted that nonresident aliens are generally permitted to bring
su-h a suit;83 to hold otherwise, it has been argued, would en-
449; Squilache v. Tidewater Coal & Coke Co., (1908) 64 W. Va. 337.
62 S. E. 446; Cetofonte v. Camden Coke Co., (1910) 78 N. J. L. 662, 75
Atl. 913; Mulhall v. Fallon, (1900) 176 Mass. 266, 57 N. E. 386, 54 L. R. A.
934. Although alien enemies have been denied the right to sue, Riddell
v. Fuhrman, (1919) 233 Mass. 69, 123 N. E. 237, except when named as
defendant, Watts, Watts & Co. v. Unione Austriaca Di Navigazione, (1918)
248 U. S. 9, 39 Sup. Ct. 1, 63 L. Ed. 100, Dorsey v. Thompson, (1872)
37 Md. 25, most states permit legally resident enemy aliens to sue,
Pcsselt v. D'Espard, (1917) 87 N. J. Eq. 571, 100 At. 893; State ex rel.
Constanti v. Darwin, (1918) 102 Wash. 402, 173 Pac. 29. On the question
of the right of an alien enemy to sue, see cases in 3 A. L. R. 341 and
Note, (1919) 3 MINNESOTA LAw REviEw 351.77Taylor v. Carpenter, (C.C. Mass. 1846) 2 Woodb. & M. 1, Fed. Cas.
No. 13,785.
78Pearson v. City of Portland, (1879) 69 Me. 278, 31 Am. Rep. 276.
'9 Taylor v. Carpenter, (C.C. Mass. 1846) 2 Woodb. & M. 1, Fed. Cas.
No. 13,785. .8 5Lewicki v. John C. Wiardi & Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1914) 213 Fed. 647.
See Note, Position of Aliens under Modern Compensation Laws, (1926)
11 MINNESOTA LAW REvIv 57.81Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, (1916) 172 Cal. 407, 156
Pac. 491, Ann. Cas. 1917E 390. Statutes limiting the amount of compensa-
tion receivable by nonresident aliens to 33% or 50% of the amount
allowed to residents of the state have been sustained on the ground that
such aliens do not qualify as "persons" under the fourteenth amendment,
having never been within the jurisdiction of the state, and on the further
ground that compensation acts are founded in public policy, to provide
a means whereby resident dependents shall not become a burden on the
public. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Chamos, (1924) 203 Ky. 820, 263 S. W.
370; Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Co., (1918) 25 Wyo. 511, 173
Pac. 981. Contra: Vietti v. George K. Mackie Fuel Co., (1921) 109 Kan
179, 197 Pac. 881, in respect to a resident alien.82Pocahontas Collieries Co. v. Rukas' Adm'r, (1905) 104 Va. 278,
51 S. E. 449.83Romano v. Brick & Pipe Co., (1904) 125 Iowa 591, 101 N. W. 437.
68 L. R. A. 132, 106 Am. St. Rep. 323; Pittsburgh. etc., Ry. Co. v. Naylor,
(1905) 73 Ohio St. 115, 76 N. E. 505, 3 L. R. A. (N.S.) 473, 112 Am.
St. Rep. 701, Renlund v. Commodore Mining Co.. (1903) 89 Minn. 41,
93 N. W. 1057, 99 Am. St. Rep. 534; Railway Co. v. Fajardo, (1906) 74 Kan.
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courage negligence on the part of employers, 84 and would be a
departure from the liberal policy which modern, enlightened gov-
ernments seek to foster with respect to foreigners, according to
which the alien ought to be protected in every reasonable way. 85
In any event, considering the very large amount of foreign labor
employed in this country, no exception as against the claims of
nonresident dependents could be silently read into the law.80
A rather novel question has recently arisen with reference to
the alien's right to sue where the alien is found to be within the
United States unlawfully. The Wisconsin court held, in 1933,
that such an alien was not competent to bring suit in an action
for personal services on the ground that he is "a defiant person
challenging the ability of this country to enforce its own laws,"
arguing that the protection of the fourteenth amendment cannot
be extended so as to give an alien the right to demand the help
of the courts in frustrating the plain purpose of acts of Congress
regulating immigration.8 7  The Massachusetts court has refused
to accept this view, in an automobile accident case, holding that
the illegal entry was not a contributing cause of the injury,88 and
a New York court, in an action involving false imprisonment and
malicious prosecution, has reached the same conclusion, stating
that "even the meanest outcast is entitled to protection against
unlawful restraint of his person."'89 This would appear to be the
better and more liberal view.90
314, 86 Pac. 301, 6 L. R. A. (N.S.) 681; Patek v. Am. Smelting & Re-
fining Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1907) 154 Fed. 190. This is in accord with
the interpretation given to Lord Campbell's Act in the English courts,
Davidsson v. Hill, [1901] 2 K. B. 606. Contra: Deni v. Penna. R. Co.,
(1897) 181 Pa. St. 525, 37 At!. 558, 59 Am. St. Rep. 676; Brannigan v.
Union Gold Mining Co., (C.C. Colo. 1899) 93 Fed. 164; McMillan v. Spider
Lake Sawmill & Lumber Co., (1902) 115 Wis. 332, 91 N. W. 979, 60
L. R. A. 589, 95 Am. St. Rep. 947.84Ferrara v. Auric Mining Co., (1908) 95 Pac. 952, 43 Colo. 496;
Kellyville Coal Co. v. Petraytis, (1902) 195 Ill. 215, 63 N. E. 94, 88
Am. St. Rep. 191; Vetaloro v. Perkins, (C.C. Mass. 1900) 101 Fed. 393.
85Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co. v. Osgood, (1905) 36 Ind. App. 34, 73
N. E. 285; Alfson v. Bush Co., (1905) 182 N. Y. 393. 75 N. E. 230, 108
Am. St. Rep. 815; Bonthron v. Phoenix Light & Fuel Co., (1903) 8
Ariz. 129, 71 Pac. 941, 61 L. R. A. 563; Szymanski v. Blumenthal, (1902)
3 Penniwell (Del.) 558, 52 AtI. 347.86Mulhall v. Fallon, (1900) 176 Mass. 266, 57 N. E. 386, 54 L. R. A.
934, 79 Am. St. Rep. 309, Holmes, C. J.87Coules v. Pharris, (1933) 212 Wis. 558, 250 N. W. 404.
8sjanusis v. Long, (1933) 284 Mass. 403, 188 N. E. 228.
89Rodney v. Interborough R. T. Co., (1932) 149 Misc. Rep. 271, 267
N. Y. S. 86.
"See Bell, Unlawful Entry as a Bar to Maintaining Suit, (1934) 29
Ill. L. Rev. 101; (1934) 68 U. S. L. Rev. 178; (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev.
520; (1934) 33 Mich. L. Rev. 292; (1934) 18 MINNESOTA LAw REviEW 214.
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The alien may assert in the courts the constitutional guarantees
of due process and equal protection of the laws set forth in the
fifth and fourteenth amendments. The constitution extends these
guarantees to "persons" and not merely to citizens, and these
words, it has been held, apply to aliens as well as to citizens.
"The fourteenth amendment to the constitution," the Supreme
Court has declared, "is not confined to the protection of citizens.
. . . These provisions are universal in their application, to all
persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality." 9' Thus, a statute
or regulation which discriminates against aliens, or treats them
separately as a class, is not per se a proper classification; the
classification or special treatment must be justified as a reasonable
one, and as advancing some special or particular public interest.12
The classification must be justified as a proper means of accom-
plishing a legitimate end.
Apparently, the alien should be entitled to the protection of all
the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, including freedom of religion,
speech and press, and the procedural safeguards pertaining to
criminal cases. 93 There seems to be, however, some confusion, and
some doubt, as to how much freedom of speech the alien enjoys.
He has a right to use his own language, as is illustrated in the
case of the Philippine Bookkeeping Act, which prevented Chinese
merchants from keeping their books in Chinese, and which the
court declared to be a denial of the equal protection of the laws.'
And it has been held that the alien has a right "to comment,
fairly, upon governmental policies and actions."9 5 But some courts
9Yick Wo v. Hopkins, (1886) 118 U. S. 356, 369, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064.
30 L. Ed. 220, Matthews, J. The enjoyment by an alien of these consti-
tutional guarantees does not depend upon the fact that we have not
recognized his home country, nor does it have anything to do with the
standards of justice of that country. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United
States, (1931) 282 U. S. 481, 51 Sup. Ct. 229, 75 L. Ed. 473; Sliosberg v.
N. Y. Life Ins. Co., (1927) 244 N. Y. 482, 155 N. E. 749.92Truax v. Raich, (1915) 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7, 60 L Ed. 131.
93See, for example, the interesting case of Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, (C.C.
Calif. 1879) 5 Sawy. 552, Fed. Cas. No. 6,546, where the court held that
an ordinance which provided that every male imprisoned in jail was to
have his hair cut to a uniform length of one inch from the scalp was
aimed at the removal of the Chinese queue, and was therefore a denial
of the equal protection of the laws. Apparently, religious and racial sensi-
bilities are entitled to judicial protection.
94Yu Cong Eng. v. Trinidad, Collector, (1926) 271 U. S. 500, 46 Sup.
Ct. 619, 70 L. Ed. 1059. Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, (1923) 262 U. S. 390.
43 Sup. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042, as to the right to use German in the
schools.
95Van Lonkhuyzen v. Daily News Co., (1918) 203 Mich. 570, 170
N. W. 93.
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maintain that the alien's freedom to express political opinions is
something less than that of the citizen. Thus it has been held
that the alien has no constitutional right to share in the privilege
or responsibility of attempting to change our form of government.9 6
Furthermore, it may be noted that the act of Congress"T providing
for the deportation of alien anarchists has been held not to be a
denial of freedom of speech, since Congress is free to exclude or
deport any class of aliens it desires to keep out." Communists
have been deported on the ground that no alien has the right to
preach revolution, and naturalization orders have been cancelled
in cases of political radicalism, the courts taking the view that
such persons could not have meant what they said when they took
the oath of allegiance. 1°0
Another source of legal protection for the alien is found in
the treaty-making -power of the federal government. Treaties are
declared to be, by the constitution, the supreme law of the land.
The federal government, under its treaty power, may confer rights
on aliens, as against the state governments, which aliens would not
otherwise have without the states' consent, as, for example, the
right of inheritance,' 0' or the right to conduct a certain kind of
business." 2 Furthermore, the national government has the power
to provide for the punishment of those who are guilty of depriving
96State v. Sinchuk, (1921) 96 Conn. 605, 115 At. 33, 20 A. L. R. 1515,
but see the vigorous dissenting opinion of Wheeler, C. J.; Goldman v.
Reyburn, (1909) 36 Pa. Co. 581. For a criticism of the Sinchuk Case,
see Comment, Has an Alien the Privilege of Free Speech?, (1922) 31
Yale L. J. 422.
97Alien Immigration Act of March, 1903, 32 Stat. at L. 1213.98United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, (1904) 194 U. S. 279,
24 Sup. Ct. 719, 48 L. Ed. 979.
99Kjar v. Doak, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 566: "Revolution
presupposes an antagonism between a government and its nationals, not
between a government and aliens."
loOUnited States v. Tapolcsanyi, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1930) 40 F. (2d) 255.
xOlHauenstein v. Lynham, (1879) 100 U. S. 483, 25 L. Ed. 628; Santo-
vincenzo v. Egan, (1931) 284 U. S. 30, 52 Sup. Ct. 82, 76 L. Ed. 151;
Geofroy v. Riggs, (1889) 133 U. S. 258, 10 Sup. Ct. 295, 33 L. Ed. 642;
Todok v. Union State Bank, (1930) 281 U. S. 449, 50 Sup. Ct. 363, 74
L. Ed. 956; Rizzotto v. Grima, (1927) 164 La. 1, 113 So. 658; In re
Romaris' Estate, (1923) 191 Cal. 740, 218 Pac. 421. See Stoke, The
Foreign Relations of the Federal State; Kuhn, Supremacy of Treaties over
State Laws in Respect to the Intestate Estates of Aliens, (1932) 26 Am.
J. Int. L. 348.
'O2Jordan v. Tashiro, (1928) 278 U. S. 123, 49 Sup. Ct. 47, 73
L. Ed. 214; Asakura v. Seattle, (1924) 265 U. S. 332, 44 Sup. Ct. 515,
68 L. Ed. 1041; State v. Tagami, (1925) 195 Cal. 522, 234 Pac. 102;
Bobe v. Lloyds, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1926) 10 F. (2d) 730, cert. denied, (1926)
270 U. S. 663, 46 Sup. Ct. 472, 70 L. Ed. 788; United States & Cuban
Allied Works Engineering Corp. v. Lloyds, (D.C. N.Y. 1923) 291 Fed. 889.
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foreigners of rights and privileges guaranteed to them by treaty.10 3
Finally, it may be noted that the treaty protection is heightened a
bit by the familiar rule of construction that treaties are to be
liberally construed to carry out the apparent intention of the
parties.10 ' The construction of a treaty, Mr. Justice Paterson
wrote in a famous case, ought to be "liberal and benign."'10 And,
in the language of Mr. Justice Swayne,
"where a treaty admits of two constructions, one restrictive as
to the -rights that may be claimed under it, and the other liberal,




III. TH.E RIGHT TO WORK FOR A LIVING
In a general way, what right to work for a living in the
common occupations of the community does the alien enjoy?1oT
In the leading case of Truiax v. Raich,108 the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional an Arizona statute which required that
not less than 80 per cent of those who are employed in establish-
ments having five or more workers, "regardless of kind or class
of work," must be qualified electors or native-born citizens. The
court held that this statute was a violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment, asserting that the police power does not go so far as to
make it possible for the state to deny to lawful inhabitants, be-
cause of their race or nationality, the ordinary means of earning
a livelihood. For the right to work for a living in the common
occupations of the community, Mr. Justice Hughes stated, is of
the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that
it was the purpose of the amendment to secure. Furthermore,
S0 3Baldwin v. Franks, (1887) 120 U. S. 678, 7 Sup. Ct. 656, 32 L. Ed.
766.
104Jordan v. Tashiro, (1928) 278 U. S. 123, 49 Sup. Ct. 47, 73 L. Ed.
214; Tucker v. Alexandroff, (1902) 183 U. S. 424, 22 Sup. Ct. 195, 46
L. Ed. 264; Nielson v. Johnson, (1929) 279 U. S. 47, 49 Sup. Ct. 223.
73 L. Ed. 607. See Tennant, The Judicial Process of Treaty Interpretation
in the United States Supreme Court, (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 1016; Lenoir.
Treaties and the Supreme Court, (1934) 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 602.
105Ware v. Hylton, (1796) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 199, 255, 1 L. Ed. 568.
1O6Hauenstein v. Lynham, (1879) 100 U. S. 483, 487, 25 L. Ed. 628.
Cf. the similar statement of Story, J., in Shanks v. Dupont, (1830) 3
Pet. (U.S.) 242, 249, 7 L. Ed. 666.
1O7See Chamberlain, Aliens and the Right to Work, (1932) 18 Am.
Bar Ass'n J. 379; Kohler, Legal Disabilities of Aliens in the United
States, (1930) 16 Am. Bar Ass'n J. 113; Kneier, Discrimination against
Aliens by Municipal Ordinances, (1928) 16 Georgetown L. J. 143; Note.
Constitutionality of Legislative Discrimination against the Alien in his
Right to Work, (1934) 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 74.
108(1915) 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7, 60 L. Ed. 131.
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it was held that while the state clearly has a wide power of
classification, the classification must be reasonable, and consistent
with the legitimate interests of the state; in this case, it was
asserted that no special public interest with respect to any particular
business is shown that could possibly justify the legislation.
Finally, it was pointed out that the authority to admit or exclude
aliens is vested solely in the federal government, and that the
assertion of the power to deny aliens the opportunity of earning
a livelihood when lawfully admitted to the state amounts to an
assertion of the right to exclude them altogether, "for in ordinary
cases they cannot live where they cannot work."
Other cases have strengthened this point of view. Thus a
statute which made it unlawful for any corporation to employ
nondeclarant aliens was held to deny both due process and the
equal protection of the laws, the court asserting that a state
legislature "has no authority to deprive a person of the right
to labor at any legitimate business."' °9 A state constitutional
provision, implemented by a penal statute, which forbade all
corporations formed under the laws of the state to employ Chinese
or Mongolians, "directly or indirectly in any capacity," was held
to be invalid as being contrary to the treaty with China, a denial
of the constitutional rights of the owners of corporate property
to employ whatever labor they choose, and a denial of the equal
protection of the laws. 110 Judge Sawyer wrote, in that case:
"The right to labor is, of all others, after the right to live,
the fundamental, inalienable right of man, wherever he may be
permitted to be, of which he cannot be deprived, either under the
guise of law or otherwise, except by usurpation and force."
And Judge Hoffman declared, in the same case, that the right to
work for a living "is as inviolable as the right of property. for
property is the off-spring of labor. It is as sacred as the right
to life, for life is taken if the means whereby we live be taken.""'
In line with this doctrine, a Pennsylvania statute, imposing on
every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons a tax
of three cents a day for every alien so employed, was declared
by the courts to be invalid, because the classification made by the
statute was obviously arbitrary. 12 Similarly, a recent Michigan
lOfEx parte Case, (1911) 20 Idaho 128, 116 Pac. 1037.
1101n re Tiburcio Parrott, (C.C. Cal. 1880) 1 Fed. 481.
11'In re Tiburcio Parrott, (C.C. Cal. 1880) 1 Fed. 481, 506, 498.
12 Fraser v. McConway & Torley Co., (C.C. Pa. 1897) 82 Fed. 257:
Juniata Limestone Co. v. Fagley, (1898) 187 Pa. St. 193, 40 Ati. 977, 42
L. R. A. 442.
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statute which required aliens to obtain certificates of legal resi-
dence as a prerequisite for any employment or business within the
state, and which provided that aliens who entered the country
illegally, or who are "undesirable" as defined by the laws of the
United States should not be entitled to such certificates, was
held unconstitutional as an invasion of a field of regulation in
which the power of the federal government is "paramount and
exclusive."'18
The general rule, then, is that an alien is permitted to work in
the common occupations of the community, and that the federal
constitution will protect his right to work. But general rules do
not decide specific cases, and in many different situations this
basic right of the alien has been called into question. This problem
has arisen in legislation dealing with the professions. Most states
demand citizenship as a prerequisite for the practice of law,
11
4
and this requirement has been universally sustained as a proper
classification." 5 It has been argued that this profession requires
an appreciation of and a desire to maintain our political insti-
tutions; it is closely related to the maintenance of the civil rights
of the citizen. Furthermore, it is said that the alien cannot very
well take the oath required of lawyers. There is the possibility,
also, that the alien may put himself outside of the jurisdiction of
the state courts, in cases of unprofessional conduct requiring the
invocation of the disciplinary power of the court; at least, there
is the possibility of removal to the federal courts. '1 Finally, the
lawyer is considered to be an officer of the court, and the con-
stitution does not require the state to confer upon the alien an
"1sArrowsmith v. Voorhies, (D.C. Mich. 1931) 55 F. (2d) 310.
114For recent statutes see: California, Gen. Laws (Deering, 1931)
Act 591, sec. 24; Maine, Laws 1931, ch. 176, sec. 26. In New York, Consol.
Laws (Cahill, 1930) ch. 66, sec. 24-a, no one may represent any claimant
before the industrial board under the workmen's compensation act unless he
is a citizen. Several states prohibit aliens from acting as executors. See
Arizona, Rev. Code 1928, sec. 3925; Maryland, Ann. Code (Bagby 1924)
art. 93, sec. 53.
125In re Yamashita, (1902) 30 Wash. 234, 70 Pac. 482, 59 L. R. A.
671, 94 Am. St. Rep. 860; In re Hong Yen Chang, (1890) 84 Cal. 163. 24
Pac. 156; In re O'Neill, (1882) 90 N. Y. 584; Ex parte.Thompson, (1824)
3 Hawks (N.C.) 355; In re Admission to Bar, (1900) 61 Neb. 58, 84
N. W. 611. Where the state law permits alien declarants to practice law.
and the petition for naturalization of a particular declarant is later denied,
he is not eligible for membership in the bar, since it may be assumed that
alien declarants should be admitted only where the declared intention will
in due course ripen into citizenship. In re O'Sullivan, (D.C. Mont. 1920)
267 Fed. 230.
ileEx parte Thompson, (1824) 3 Hawks (N.C.) 355; In re Admission
to Bar, (1900) 61 Neb. 58, 84 N. W. 611.
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official status. Disqualification for the bar because of alienage is
in accord with the general doctrine that the right to practice law
is not a privilege or immunity of a citizen of the United States,
but a privilege subject to the control of the state legislature.",
There has been a great deal of legislation in recent years
affecting the alien's right to engage in various other professions
where the justification is not so clear. A number of states now
limit the practice of medicine to citizens or declarants," 8 and
several states admit declarants who complete their citizenship with-
in a certain period of years." 9 Florida requires citizenship for
osteopaths and podiatrists,1 2 while New York permits aliens or
declarants to become osteopaths or dentists," 1 but flatly requires
citizenship for veterinarians. 22 A number of states have in recent
years passed legislation requiring citizenship for optometrists,""
and many states now demand that pharmacists be citizens12' or at
least declarants.12 5 Recent legislation in several states now re-
117Ex parte Lockwood, (1894) 154 U. S. 116, 14 Sup. Ct. 1082, 38
L. Ed. 929; State v. Rosborough, (1922) 152 La. 946, 94 So. 858; In the
Matter of Charles Taylor, (1877) 48 Md. 28.
"'sSee, for example, Florida, Comp. Laws 1927, sec. 3408 (1) ; Nevada,
Laws 1931, ch. 206; Wisconsin, Stats. 1935, sec. 147.15.
119New Jersey, Comp. Stat., Supp. 1925-1930, sec. 127-31 (citizenship
must be completed within 6 years of making the declaration of intention) ;
Rhode Island, Laws 1927, ch. 1029, sec. 3 (citizenship must be completed
within five years after examination by the board of health).
" 0Florida, Comp. Laws 1927, secs. 3422, 3465.
12'New York Consol. Laws (Cahill, 1930) ch. 15, sees. 1256 (1),
1259 (osteopaths must complete citizenship within ten years after declara-
tion of intention); New York, Consol. Laws (Cahill, Supp. 1933), ch. 15,
sec. 1306 (3) (dentists must complete citizenship within six years of the
date of the license).
"2rNew York, Consol. Laws (Cahill, 1930) ch. 15, sec. 1326.
"'Michigan, Comp. Stat. 1929, sec. 6783; Montana, Rev. Code 1935,
sec. 3159 (2) ; New Mexico, Stat. Ann. 1929, sec. 98-106 (d) (citizen or
declarant) ; Rhode Island, Laws 1929, ch. 1399, sec. 2; Tennessee, Code
Ann. 1932, sec. 7032; Washington, Rev. Stat. Ann. (Rem. 1932) sec.
10150.
124Colorado, Comp. Laws Supp. 1932, sec. 4589; Connecticut, Gen.
Stat. 1930, sec. 2825; Maine, Laws 1931, ch. 48, sec. 7; Michigan, Comp.
Laws (Mason's 1933 Supp.) sec. 6836; New Hampshire, Public Laws 1926,
ch. 210, sec. 18; Ohio, General Code Ann. (Page, 1935) secs. 1303-4,
1304; Oregon, Code (Supp. 1935) sec. 68-2040; Rhode Island, Acts 1932,
ch. 1962, sec. 2(1); Utah, Revised Stats. Ann. 1933, sec. 79-12-1; Ver-
mont, Public Laws 1933, sec. 7528. South Dakota requires citizenship
for dealers in poisons. Compiled Laws 1929, sec. 7846.
"'California, Codes & Gen. Laws (Deering, 1933 Supp.) Act 5886,
sec. 2; New Jersey, Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1925-1930) sec. 157-4 (but license
to declarant is good for only six years from date of declaration, New
Jersey, Laws 1935, ch. 232) ; N.ew York, Consol. Laws (Cahill, 1930) ch.
15. sec. 1353g (must complete citizenship within time prescribed by law)
Wisconsin, Stats. 1935, ch. 151.02 (1).
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quires citizenship for undertakers and embalmers. '6 A number
of states have, in the past few years, provided that architects must
be citizens127 or at least declarants, 12 1 and so, too, with reference
to engineers and surveyors. 29 Furthermore, a great many states
now require, by legislation, that accountants possess citizenship,' "
or that they have filed their declarations of intention. 131 Finally,
recent legislation has been enacted requiring citizenship for mem-
bership on state trade and professional boards having general
supervisory powers over trades and professions, particularly in
reference to the granting and revocation of licenses.1 2
120New York, Consol, Laws (Cahill 1930) ch. 46, secs. 293, 295;
Pennsylvania, Stats. Ann. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 63, sec. 478c; Rhode Island,
Gen. Stats. 1932, ch. 1886, sec. 6; South Dakota, Laws 1931, ch. 216, sec. 2;
Wisconsin, Stats. 1935, ch. 156.04 (2), ch. 156.05 (2); Wyoming, Rev.
Stats. Ann. 1931, sec. 37-104.
127Kentucky, Stats. Ann. (Carroll 1936) sec. 73-5; Michigan, Comp.
Laws 1929, sec. 8680; South Dakota, Comp. Laws 1925, sec. 8194-G(a).
' 28Georgia, Code 1933, sec. 84-303; Idaho, Code Ann. 1932, sec. 53-402;
Iowa, Code 1935, ch. 91-31, sec. 1905-b8; New York, Consol. Laws
(Cahill, 1933 Supp.) ch. 15, sec. 1478; Ohio, General Code Ann. (Page,
1935) sec. 1334-6; Oregon, Code Ann. 1930, sec. 68-305 (a); Virginia.
Code Ann. (Michie 1930) sec. 3145g; Washington, Revised Stats. Ann.
(Remington 1932) sec. 8271; West Virginia, Code Ann. (Michie, 1932)
sec. 2958.
' 29Citizens: South Dakota, Camp. Laws 1929, sec. 8194-G (a); Wyoming,
Rev. Stat. Ann. 1931, sec. 114-106. Citizens or declarants: Indiana, Stat.
Ann. (Burns, 1933) sec. 63-1509 (2); New York, Consol. Laws (Cahill,
1933 Supp.) ch. 15, sec. 1452 (2); South Carolina Code (Michie, 1932)
sec. 7070(e) (declarant must complete naturalization within 3 years after
being granted certificate of registration); Virginia, Code Ann. 1930, sec.
3145g.
230Alabama, Code (Michie 1928) sec. 16; Florida, Laws 1931, ch. 15637,
sec. 5 (earlier statute, Florida, Comp. Laws 1927, sec. 3923, admitting
declarants who acquired citizenship within six years, was dropped);
Georgia, Code 1933, sec. 84-201; Louisiana, Gen. Stats. (Dart 1932) sec.
9335; Massachusetts, Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) ch. 112, sec. 87b; New
Mexico, Stats. Ann. 1929, sec. 108-101; Oklahoma, Stats. 1931, sec. 4310(a) ;
South Carolina, Code 1932, sec. 7090; Vermont, Public Laws 1933, sec.
7635.
'31Idaho, Code Ann. 1932, sec. 53-202; Illinois, Rev. Stats. 1935, ch.
110a, secs. 1, 13; Indiana, Ann. Stat. (Bums, 1933) sec. 63-404; Iowa,
Code 1935, ch. 91-cl, sec. 1905-c9; Kentucky, Stats. Rev. (Carroll, 1936)
sec. 3941e-4; Maryland, Ann. Code (Bagby 1924) art. 75a, secs. 6-7;
Montana, Rev. Codes 1935, sec. 3241.1; Michigan, Comp. Laws 1929,
sec. 8651 (must complete citizenship within six years); Nevada, Comp.
Laws (Hillyer, 1929) sec. 252-3; New Hampshire, Public Laws 1926, ch.
270, sec. 3; North Carolina, Code Ann. (Michie, 1931) sec. 7024b; North
Dakota, Supp. 1925, sec. 557a-8 (must become citizen within one year);
Tennessee, Code 1932, sec. 7084; Utah, Revised Stat. 1933, sec. 79-2-I;
Virginia, Code 1930, sec. 567; Washington, Revised Stat. Ann. (Redi. 1932)
sec. 8268; Wisconsin, Stats. 1935, ch. 135.04(2).
132Michigan, Comp. Laws Supp. 1933, sec. 8714-5 (board of cosmetol-
ogy) ; New Jersey, Laws 1935, ch. 307, sec. I (board of beauty culture
control-must have been citizens for at least five years before appointment);
New Jersey, Laws 1935, ch. 281, sec. 2 (board for cleaning and dyeing
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It is not at all clear that the reasoning in the cases dealing
with exclusion from the legal profession would justify exclusion
from medicine, engineering, accountancy and the like, for the
legal profession is sufficiently unique to be differentiated. The
lawyer is an officer of the court, and has an unusually close
connection with the laws of the land and the civic rights of the
individual. 3 ' But what public interest is promoted by requiring
citizenship of doctors and embalmers? In what respect is a
citizen, merely because he is a citizen, likely to be a better pharm-
acist or engineer or accountant than an alien? The power of the
state to classify is conceded by all courts to be very great, and
since government is not an exact science, it is sufficient if the
classification is roughly adapted to proper ends, but the power of
classification is not an arbitrary power, and its exercise must be
reasonably related to the advancement or protection of legitimate
public interests.
The issue has been drawn by the courts more clearly in refer-
ence to the "garden variety" trades and callings. The Massa-
chusetts court has sustained a statute requiring citizenship or a
declaration of intention for the granting of a peddler's license as
a proper exercise of the police power. 34  The court argued that
the regulation is justifiable because of the opportunities for fraud
in the business, on the analogy of similar laws in connection with
liquor dealers, and expressed the belief that the possession of
domicile and citizenship might be important to those seeking
remedies for wrongs done. On the contrary, a Maine statute
providing that peddler's licenses be granted to citizens only was
declared unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection, the court
asserting the familiar doctrine that an alien has a right to pursue
a business or occupation, and to acquire and enjoy property, on
equal terms with citizens.'35 In accordance with the current anti-
alien tendency of state legislation, it may be noted that several
states have recently adopted a statutory requirement of citizenship
trade-must have been citizens for at least three years) ; North Carolina.
Code Ann. 1931, sec. 5168 (ss) (board of examiners of plumbing and




1n Templar v. State, (1902) 131 Mich. 254, 90 N. W. 1058, the
court said, in a dictum: "But the practice of medicine is no more an
incident of citizenship than the practice of the trade of a barber."
1'34Commonwealth v. Hana, (1907) 195 Mass. 272, 81 N. E. 149, 11
L. R. A. (N.S.) 799, 122 Am. St. Rep. 251, 11 Ann. Cas. 514.
'35State v. Montgomery, (1900) 94 Me. 192, 47 Atl. 165, 80 Am. St.
Rep. 386.
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or a declaration of intention as a prerequisite for engaging in the
business of peddling."' 8
The Minnesota court has reached the conclusion that it is
proper to require citizenship for auctioneers2" In its opinion,
the court pointed out that the courts ought to go slowly in
declaring the legislature wrong as to the facts, and that the evil
against which the statute is directed may be that aliens, lacking
the interest in the welfare of state and country which the citizen
has, were acting as auctioneers to the harm of the public. Further-
more, the court expressed the belief that the auctioneer may be
considered as an administrative officer of the state, like the lawyer
or certified public accountant. The courts of New Jersey and
Rhode Island have sustained municipal ordinances prohibiting the
issuance of licenses to aliens to operate buses or "jitneys," on
the ground that the use of the public highways by common carriers
is a privilege and not an inalienable right of the individual and
that therefore the state may grant or withhold the privilege on its
own terms. 3" In declaring that this is a proper classification,
the Rhode Island court asserted that it fairly may be said that
"aliens as a class are naturally less interested in the state, the
safety of its citizens, and the public welfare than citizens of the
state. . . ." Likewise, a statute requiring an applicant for a pilot's
license to be an American citizen and a legal voter has been
upheld.139 Similarly, statutes and ordinances prohibiting aliens
from conducting pool rooms have been sustained,'14 0 the courts
136Georgia, Code 1933, sec. 84-2002-3; Massachusetts, Gen. Laws 1932,
ch. 101, sec. 22; New Hampshire, Laws 1931, ch. 102, sec. 4. Junk can-
vassers in Virginia must now be citizens, Virginia, Code Ann. 1930, Tax
Code, sec. 182.
"'7Wright v. May, (1914) 127 Minn. 150, 149 N. W. 9. See Mason's
Minn. 1927 Stats. sec. 7322.
138Morin v. Nunan, (1918) 91 N. J. L. 506, 103 Atli. 378; Gizzarelli
v. Presbrey, (1922) 44 R. 1. 333, 117 Atl. 359. New York recently
passed a law providing that a chauffeur's license shall be granted to
citizens or declarants between 1933 and 1939, and after 1939 to citizens
only. New York, Consol. Laws (Cahill, Cum. Supp. 1931-1935), ch. 64-a.
sec. 20(a). Cf. Georgia, Order of Pub. Service Comm., Oct. 1. 1929,
U. S. Daily, Oct. 30, 1929; Rhode Island, Ordinance of Providence 1920,
ch. 93, sec. 4, in reference to bus drivers.
"39 State v. Ames, (1907) 47 Wash. 328, 92 Pac. 137. For a recent
statute providing that pilots must be citizens, see Oregon Code, Supp.
1935, sec. 65-316.
140hOio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, (1927) 274 U. S. 392, 47 Sup.
Ct. 666, 71 L. Ed. 1156; Anton v. Van Winkle, (D.C. Or. 1924) 297 Fed.
340; State ex rel. Balli v. Carrel, (1919) 99 Ohio St. 285, 124 N. E. 129. See
comments in (1928) 22 11. L. Rev. 755; (1927) 1 So. Calif. L. Rev. 94.
For a recent statute requiring operators of pool rooms to be citizens, see
Georgia, Code 1933, sec. 84-1603.
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leaning heavily on the doctrine that because of the harmful and
vicious tendencies associated with public pool rooms, the state
may go so far in regulating them as to forbid completely their
operation. 141 The Supreme Court took the position that it was
not necessary for the Court to be satisfied that the premise of
the statute is founded in experience; it is' enough to say that in
the light of facts admitted or generally assumed, there is the
possibility of a rational basis for the legislative judgment. The
Court asserted that it had no such knowledge of local conditions
that would enable it to say that the legislature was clearly wrong
in making this discrimination."'
A similar conclusion has been reached in reference to statutes
which deny aliens licenses to sell liquor."' It has been argued that
because of the many evils connected with the liquor business, it
has always been subjected to an extraordinary amount of state
regulation, even to the point of prohibition, and that not even the
citizen has an inherent right to sell liquor." As to the discrimina-
tion against aliens, it is maintained that citizens of this country
"might reasonably be supposed to have a regard for its welfare"
which aliens do not have. 4 - There has been a difference of opin-
141Murphy v. California, (1912) 225 U. S. 623, 32 Sup. Ct. 697, 56
L. Ed. 1229.
142Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, (1927) 274 U. S. 392, 47 Sup.
Ct. 666, 71 L. Ed. 1156. In Anton v. Van Winkle, (D.C. Or. 1924) 297
Fed. 340, Judge Wolverton was more direct: "It may be judicially known
.. that aliens coming into this country are without the intimate knowledge
of our laws, customs, and usages that our own people have. So it is like-
wise known that certain classes of aliens are of different psychology from
our fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to
suppose that the foreign born, whose allegiance is first to their own
country, and whose ideals of governmental environment and control have
been engendered and formed under entirely different regimes and political
systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are they
as well disposed toward the United States, as those who, by citizenship, are
a part of the government itself."
143Tragesser v. Gray, (1890) 73 Md. 250, 20 Atl. 905, 9 L. R. A.
780, 25 Am. St. Rep. 587; Bloomfield v. State, (1912) 86 Ohio St. 253.
99 N. E. 309, 41 L. R. A. (N.S.) 726, Ann. Cas. 1913D 629; Trimble's
License, (1909) 41 Pa. Super. 370; Hoy's License, (1887) 3 Montg. Co.
L. Rep. 188. It is a proper exercise of the police power of the state to
require that a liquor dealer be not only a citizen, but also a resident of
the state. De Grazier v. Stephens, (1907) 101 Tex. 194. 105 S. W. 992;
Mette v. McGuckin, (1885) 18 Neb. 324, 25 N. W. 338, aff'd without
opinion, (1892) 149 U. S. 781, 13 Sup. Ct. 1050, 37 L. Ed. 960.
'44For a characteristic expression of opinion on this subject, see the
remarks of Field, J., in Crowley v. Christensen, (1890) 137 U. S. 86, 11
Sup. Ct. 13, 34 L. Ed. 620. Cf. Freund, Police Power, ch. 8.
145 Tragesser v. Gray, (1890) 73 Md. 250, 20 At. 905, 9 L. R. A.
780, 25 Am. St. Rep. 587; In Bloomfield v. State, (1912) 86 Ohio St.
253, 99 N. E. 309, 41 L. R. A. (N.S.) 726, Ann. Cas. 1913D 629, the
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ion as to the propriety of refusing licenses to aliens to sell soft
drinks, one court taking the view that this is a reasonable exer-
cise of the police power because of the possibilities of violating the
law which inhere in the soft drink business; it is therefore in the
public interest to bar "such persons as are not so attached to the
institutions of our country as to be in the class of its citizenry."'"
On the other hand, another court could not find in this classifica-
tion that any benefit would accrue to the community.'47 The rule,
however, that aliens may be denied licenses to sell intoxicating
liquor, qua alien, is now well established, and it operates to shut
aliens out of a vast area of business activity, now that the eigh-
teenth amendment has been repealed, for it is the overwhelming
tendency today, in the new legislation on the subject of the liquor
traffic, to prohibit the issuance of licenses to aliens.148
There is another side to this picture, for the right of the alien
to engage in a wide variety of common callings has been affirmed
in many cases. The Michigan court has decided that a statute
which prevents aliens from being licensed as barbers is a denial
of the equal protection of the laws which the fourteenth amend-
ment assures to all persons regardless of nationality. 14 0 Barber-
ing, the court said, is in no way injurious to the morals, health or
even the convenience of the community, so long as the barber is
technically competent. Nevertheless there has been some recent
legislation requiring citizenship or a declaration of intention for
barbers' 5" and cosmetologists."' An ordinance of San Francisco
court said that these statutes "are based upon the belief that an alien
cannot be sufficiently acquainted with our institutions and our life to enable
him to appreciate the relation of this particular business to our entire social
fabric." For a criticism of this point of view, see Note, (1912) 12 Col.
L. Rev. 737.
146 Miller v. City of Niagara Falls, (1924) 207 App. Div. 798, 202
N. Y. S. 549.
147George v. City of Portland, (1925) 114 Or. 418, 235 Pac. 681.
148See: Arizona, Laws 1935, ch. 46, sec. 4; Iowa, Code 1935. secs.
1921-f102, 1921-f103, 1921-f104; Nebraska, Statutes Cum. Supp. 1933, sec.
53-203; New Jersey, Laws 1934, ch. 85, sec. 22; New York. Consol. Laws
(Cahill, Cum. Supp. 1931-1935) ch. 2-a, sec. 126 (3) ; Oklahoma, Laws
1933, p. 342; Oregon, Code Supp. 1935, sec. 15-1017(7) ; Pennsylvania.
Stats. Ann. (Purdon 1935) tit. 47, secs. 89, 94(c); Texas, Ann. Stat.
(Vernon 1936) Penal Code, sec. 666-18; West Virginia, Laws 1935, c. 6.
sec. 99(b) ; Wisconsin, Stats. 1935, sec. 176.05(9).
149Templar v. State, (1902) 131 Mich. 254, 90 N. W. 1058, 100 Am.
St. Rep. 610.
15oCitizens: Oregon, Code Supp. 1935, sec. 68-405(7), also apprentices,
sec. 68-406(7); Wisconsin. Stats. 1935, sec. 158.11(d). Declarants: Idaho,
Code Ann. 1932, sec. 53-605, 6; Iowa, Code 1935, sec. 2585-b13 (4).
151Idaho, Code Ann. 1932, sec. 53-1205 (cosmetologists must be citi-
zens or declarants); Wisconsin, Stats. 1935, sec. 159.08 (a) (managers
of beauty parlors must be citizens).
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requiring all Chinese to live and do business, after a certain date,
in a designated part of the city, was held to be both an arbitrary
confiscation of property contrary to due process of law, and an
illegal discrimination denying the equal protection of the laws." 2
The same result was reached in the case of municipal quarantine
orders which required all Chinese to submit to an inoculation be-
cause of an alleged bubonic plague, and which restrained the
Chinese within the city and county until they submitted to in-
oculation, the courts holding that, in the absence of evidence
showing a special need for inoculating the Chinese, this constituted
a discriminatory interference with personal liberty and the right
to pursue lawful business.'
1 3
The alien has a right to engage in the hotel and restauratit
business, and therefore a statute prohibiting Chinese from em-
ploying girls under twenty-one in hotels and restaurants is uncon-
stitutional. 5 4 So, also, the exclusion of orientals from the laundry
business by arbitrary administrative fiat is a denial of the equal
protection of the laws, even though the statute, on its face, makes
no discrimination at all.155 A laundry is not a nuisance per se, and
an ordinance requiring the recommendation of not less than twelve
citizens and taxpayers in the block, in order to obtain a license, is
contrary to the constitution, for the alien is free to pursue a
lawful business, and the licensing power cannot be used to pro-
hibit "any of the avocations of life which are not injurious to
public morals nor offensive to the senses, nor dangerous to the
public health and safety." 56  Although the laundry business may
be singled out for rather drastic regulation under the police
power.' 57 an ordinance making it unlawful to operate a laundry
within the habitable portions of the city was held to be, not a
1521n re Lee Sing, (C.C. Cal. 1890) 43 Fed. 359.
158Wong Wai v. Williamson, (C.C. Cal. 1900) 103 Fed. 1; Jew Ho v.
Williamson, (C.C. Cal. 1900) 103 Fed. 10.
1541n re opinion of the Justices, (1911) 207 Mass. 601, 94 N. E. 558,
34 L. R. A. (N.S.) 604: "The fact that a man is white, or black, or yellow
is not a just and constitutional ground for making certain conduct a crime
in him when it is treated as permissible and innocent in a person of a
different color." In Carvallo v. Cooper, (N.Y. App. Div. 1930) 239
N. Y. S. 436. it was held as a matter of statutory construction, that an
alien may operate a lodging house.
'55Yick Wo v. Hopkins, (1886) 118 U. S. 356, 6 Supp. Ct. 1064, 30 L.
Ed. 220.
1561n re Quong Woo, (C.C. Cal. 1882) 13 Fed. 229.
57Barbier v. Connolly, (1885) 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357, 28 L. Ed.
923; Soon Hing v. Crowley, (1885) 113 U. S. 703, 5 Sup. Ct. 730, 28 L. Ed.
1145.
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regulation, but a prohibition of a useful and necessary occupation,
the real purpose of which was to get rid of the Chinese."' In
accordance with this point of view, it has been held that a statute
(Philippine Bookkeeping Act of 1921) which prevents Chinese
from keeping their account books in the Chinese language uncon-
stitutionally curtails their liberty of action in preserving their prop-
erty and earning a livelihood. 159 The business of newsdealing has
been held to be a matter of private concern in which aliens have
an "inherent right" to engage. 60
A number of cases have come before the courts in which the
right to engage in a common calling was premised upon the pro-
visions of commercial treaties. Thus, while a state may deny
aliens the right to form or participate in a corporation,' " ' the gen-
eral rule may be modified by treaty. It has been held that a treaty
guaranteeing the right "to carry on trade," liberally construed,
gives the protected alien the right to do business on the same
terms as native citizens, and therefore assures him the right to
establish a hospital under a corporate form of organization.' 8 '
The same trade treaty was construed to authorize the alien to
engage in the business of conducting a pawnshop8 s and a seaside
sanitarium. 64  A treaty, however, which provided for reciprocal
"commerce" between Great Britain and the United States was
held not applicable to the insurance business, on the ground that
insurance is not "commerce."'' 5
15SIn re Tie Loy, (C.C. Cal. 1886) 26 Fed. 611, Sawyer, J.: "The
right to labor in this or any other honest, necessary, and in itself harmless
calling, where it can be the most conveniently, advantageously and profitably
carried on without injury to others, is one of the highest privileges and
immunities secured by the constitution to every American citizen, and to
every person residing within its protection." But an ordinance making it
a punishable offense for anyone to visit any gambling place in that section
of the town known as the "Chinese Quarter" has been sustained on the
ground that it applies to all who visit gambling houses in the area, and
that whites as well as Chinese own property there. In re Ah Kit, (C.C.
Cal. 1890) 45 Fed. 793.
59Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, Collector, (1926) 271 U. S. 500, 46
Sup. Ct. 619, 70 L. Ed. 1059.
'60State v. Sinchuk, (1921) 96 Conn. 605, 115 Atl. 33, 20 A. L R.
1515.
'68 State v. Travelers' Ins. Co., (1898) 70 Conn. 590, 40 Atd. 465.
8 2Tashiro v. Jordan, (1927) 201 Cal. 236, 256 Pac. 545, 53 A. L. IR
1279; Jordan v. Tashiro, (1928) 278 U. S. 123, 49 Sup. Ct. 47, 73 L. Ed.
214. The treaty was with Japan, as of April 5, 1911, 37 Stat. at L 1504.
'63Asakura v. Seattle, (1924) 265 U. S. 332, 44 Sup. Ct. 515, 68 L. Ed.
1041.
164State v. Tagami, (1925) 195 Cal. 522, 234 Pac. 102.
265Bobe v. Lloyds, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1926) 10 F. (2d) 730. The court
relied upon the definition given to the insurance business in Paul v. Vir-
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There has been a great deal of legislation in the past few
years extending the disqualification of alienage to an ever wider
area of common callings, which has not yet been tested in the
courts. A few examples of this legislation may be given. Real
estate brokers and salesmen in Pennsylvania and Wyoming must
now be citizens, 166 while in New York a declarant is eligible for
such employment provided he completes his citizenship within five
years after his declaration of intention is filed.' In several states
it is now necessary to be a citizen in order to operate an employ-
ment agency or act as an employment agent,'0 8 and the same re-
quirement has been provided for private detectives."" Bankers in
New Jersey, 70 insurance agents in Ohio,171 pawnbrokers in Vir-
ginia '7 2 and plumbers in Kentucky 73 must possess American citi-
zenship. So also, it is necessary to be a citizen in order to be
employed as a mine foreman in the coal mines of West Virginia
and Wyoming. 174 The states generally require citizenship before
granting an aviation pilot's license 7 5 or they provide that the
applicant must have a federal license from the United States De-
ginia, (1869) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 168. 19 L. Ed. 357. The treaty in question
was that of 1815, 8 Stat. at L. 228, as extended in 1827, 8 Stat. at L. 361.
But compare the interpretation of these treaties in the U. S. & Cuban
Allied Works Engineering Corp. v. Lloyds, (D.C. N.Y. 1923) 291 Fed.
889.
166Pennsylvania Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 63, sec. 436; Wyoming,
Rev. Stats. Ann. 1931, sec. 97-404.
167New York, Consol. Laws (Cahill 1930) ch. 51, sec. 440-a. In
Wisconsin it has been held that, in the absence of a requirement for
citizenship, Wisconsin, Statutes 1935, ch. 136.05, the board may question
an applicant for a real estate broker's license in regard to citizenship or
his intention to acquire citizenship but the board cannot refuse a license
because of a negative answer to either question. 19 Atty. Gen. 488.
168Iowa, Code 1935, sec. 1551-c2; Oregon, Code Ann. 1930, sec. 49-802;
Texas, Stat. (Supp. 1936) sec. 522 1a-1; West Virginia, Code Ann. 1932.
sec. 2324(8).
169California, Gen. Laws (Deering, 1931) Act 2070a, sec. 3; Michigan.
Comp. Laws 1929. sec. 8716; New York, Consol. Laws (Cahill 1930) ch.
21, sec. 71(1) ; Wisconsin, Stats. 1935, ch. 175.07(1).
170New Jersey, Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1925-1930) sec. 17-47.
'71Ohio, Gen. Code Ann. (Page 1935) sec. 654-3.
'72Virginia, Code Ann. 1930, Tax Code, sec. 191.
173Kentucky, Stat. Ann. (Carroll 1936) sec. 3909b-4.
174West Virginia, Code Ann. 1932, sec. 2426 (applies to mine foremen
and assistants) ; Wyoming, Rev. Stat. Ann. 1931, sec. 23-128 (applies to
mine foremen, assistant foremen and safety engineers). Fire bosses in
the coal mines of West Virginia must be citizens, West Virginia, Code
Ann. 1932, sec. 2421, while in Wyoming. citizens or declarants who have
used due diligence in securing citizenship papers may be employed as
shot-firers in the coal mines, Wyoming. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1931, sec. 23-165.
175See, for example, Connecticut, Gen. Stat. 1930, sec. 3061; Oregon,
Code Ann. 1930,-sec. 17-105.
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partment of Commerce.'1 6  Under the rules of the department, a
commercial pilot must either be a citizen of the United States, or
a citizen of a foreign country which grants reciprocal commercial
pilot privileges to American citizens; but declarants may secure
licenses provided they diligently and successfully prosecute the
naturalization proceedings, under penalty of revocation of the li-
cense 7 7 Finally, it should be noted that several states have re-
cently adopted, as a statutory rule, the principle of construction
that in any action, civil or criminal, involving a denial or claim
of a right or privilege which turns on the question of alienage,
the burden of proof to establish citizenship rests upon the indi-
vidual who alleges citizenship.
78
While most of the legislation excluding aliens from the com-
mon callings has been enacted by the states, Congress has, during
the past few years, done a little discriminating on its own behalf.
Liquor licenses in the District of Columbia are granted only to
citizens, 17 and licenses to operate radio stations are similarly re-
stricted.8 0 Citizenship is also required for directors of national
banks,'8" customhouse brokers,182 and radio station operators. 8
According to a statute enacted in 1928, all officers of vessels em-
ployed in the ocean mail service must be citizens; for the first
four years after the enactment of the statute, one-half of the crew
must be citizens, and after that two-thirds."8 " A statute adopted in
1936 provides that all licensed officers of vessels documented under
the laws of the United States must be citizens, and that all mem-
bers of the crew must be citizens, if working on a cargo vessel to
which a construction or operating subsidy has been granted."'8
As to passenger vessels of this description, for a period of one
year after the adoption of the act, 80 per cent of the crew must be
citizens, and then the percentage is to be increased 5 per cent a
"76Aabama, Code Supp. 1932, sec. 6070 (12); Idaho, Laws 1933, ch.
203; New Jersey, Laws 1932, ch. 51; Oklahoma, Stats. 1931, sec. 10133.
See Uniform Air Licensing Act, sec. 7.
1772 Air Commerce Bulletin, No. 20, p. 516 (Washington, April 15,
1931). The parent statute is the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. at L.
568.
178See Arizona, Laws 1933, ch. 58; California, Gen. Laws (Decring,
1931) Act 261, sec. 9b.
17948 Stat. at L. 26, sec. 5(a) (3) ; 48 Stat. at L. 328, sec. 14 (a) (2).
18044 Stat. at L. 1167, sec. 12.
18144 Stat. at L. 1233, sec. 17.
18246 Stat. at L. 759, sec. 641 (a).
21347 Stat. at L. 160, ch. 192.
18445 Stat. at L. 693, sec. 405 (c).
18549 Stat. at L. 1992, sec. 302(a).
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year until 90 per cent of the crew possess American citizenship,
and all aliens employed must either be declarants or possess other
evidences of legal admission into the United States for permanent
residence. 88
A particularly sweeping exception to the rule that aliens are
entitled to equal.treatment has been recognized by the courts where
statutes bar aliens from employment on public works, or stipulate
that citizens be given preference in such employment. Thus the
Supreme Court sustained, in Heim v. McCall,' a New York law
which provided that only American citizens could be employed on
state or municipal public works, and the statute was held valid in
reference to contractors engaged by New York City to construct
subways. The theory of the case was that the state, as employer,
has the same freedom in selecting its employees that any private
employer enjoys, and that the state may therefore prescribe what-
ever conditions it sees fit under which it will permit its work to
be done. The Court leaned heavily, in its opinion, on the prec-
edent of Atkin v. Kansas,l8 8 where a statute was sustained which
provided that all contractors doing work for the state must ob-
serve an eight-hour day, on the theory that, as guardian for its
people, and having control of their affairs, the state may pre-
scribe the conditions under which it will permit public work to
be done on its behalf.
Though there are several early precedents to the contrary, 88
this discrimination against aliens is clearly the law of the land
18649 Stat. at L. 1993, secs. 302(b), 302(c).
187(1915) 239 U. S. 175, 38 Sup. Ct. 78, 66 L. Ed. 206. At the same
time, the Court sustained the criminal features of this statute in Crane v.
New York, (1915) 239 U. S. 195, 36 Sup. Ct. 85, 60 L. Ed. 218. See
Crane v. People, (1915) 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427, L. R. A. 1916D 550,
Ann. Cas. 1915B 1254. The same conclusion was reached in People v. I. M.
Ludington's Sons, (1911) 131 N. Y. S. 550; Lee v. City of Lynn, (1916)
223 Mass. 109, 111 N. E. 700.
188(1903) 191 U. S. 207, 24 Sup. Ct. 124, 48 L. Ed. 148.
189In People v. Warren, (1895) 34 N. Y. S. 942, the superior court
of Buffalo held a statute unconstitutional which made it unlawful for one
contracting with a municipal corporation for the construction of public
works to employ aliens. The court argued that the relation of the paving
contractor to the city is that of an independent contractor who is entitled
to the same privileges that all other employers possess, including the right
to employ whatever labor he desires. The statute was also held to contra-
vene our treaty with Italy. In Baker v. Portland, (C.C. Or. 1879) 5
Sawy. 566, Fed. Cas. No. 777, an act prohibiting the employment of
Chinese laborers on public works, whether directly by governmental agencies
or by contractors working under government contracts, was held to contra-
vene a treaty guaranteeing to Chinese residing here the privileges and
immunities enjoyed by subjects of the most favored nation.
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today. It is extremely doubtful whether Atkin v. Kasas is a
precedent for these cases, since it did not involve a discrimina-
tion. It is one thing to limit the hours of labor for all to eight
hours a day, and another to discriminate against a whole class.
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the state is the same as
a private employer, for the state cannot divest itself of its public
character. 19°  Nevertheless, under the impact of the depression,
more and more legislation has been passed shutting aliens out
from employment on public works. Generally, these statutes pro-
vide that preference for such employment shall be given to citizens,
and that aliens shall be employed only if a sufficient number of
citizens is not available, or in case of emergency. 19' The Federal
Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1936 merely prohibits
the employment on public works of aliens illegally within the
United States.192
The rule with relation to public works is illustrated in the
decision of the supreme court of Washington upholding a Seattle
ordinance which provided that swill may be removed from eating
places only by citizens having a contract therefor with the city.193
The court argued that the collecting of garbage, concerning which
the police power is very great, does not fall within the classifica-
tion of common occupations and btisinesses; this is a public serv-
ice, and the contractor becomes in effect a public employee. Nor
is this statute contrary to a trade treaty, for a trade treaty does
not confer a right to engage in public work. This case further
19oSee Powell, The Right to Work for the State, (1916) 16 Col. L
Rev. 99.
291Arizona, Laws 1931, ch. 31; California, Gen. Laws (Deering, 1931)
Act 6430, secs. 1-4 (no aliens "except in cases of extraordinary emergency") ;
Connecticut, Gen. Stat. Supp. 1935, sec. 1603c; Idaho, Code Ann. 1932, sec.
43-603 (citizens or declarants); Iowa, Code 1935, sec. 1171-dl, d2; Massa-
chusetts, Ann. Laws (Michie, Cum. Supp. 1936) ch. 149, sec. 26 (preference
to citizens); Nevada- Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 6173; New Jersey, Laws
1931, ch. 27, as amended, Laws 1932, ch. 226 and Laws 1934, ch. 92 (prefer-
ence to citizens, and must be citizens of New Jersey, who have been domi-
ciled in the state continuously for one year immediately prior to such
employment); New York, Consol. Laws (Cahill, 1930) ch. 32, sec. 222; Ore-
gon, Code Ann. 1930, sec. 19-201, 202 (no Chinese or draft-dodging aliens);
Pennsylvania, Stats. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 43, sec. 151 (citizens only);
Texas, Ann. Stats. (Vernon, 1936) sec. 66 74p. It has been held, in Massa-
chusetts, that it is the duty of a city street department to discharge alien
employees, where citizens are eligible for employment, although their em-
ployment commenced prior to the enactment of the statute. 4 Op. Atty.
Gen. 300. It has also been held that such preference must be given even
if the work is performed outside the state. 4 Op. Atty. Gen. 140.
19249 Stat at L. 1609. The Works Progress Administration was set
up under this act. Exec. Order No. 7034, May 6, 1935.
193Cornelius v. City of Seattle, (1923) 123 Wash. 550, 213 Pac. 17.
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illustrates the fact that these statutes which prohibit or limit the
right of aliens to participate in public works employment tend to
whittle down the alien's opportunities to make a living in the very
fields of unskilled or semi-skilled labor where he is so frequently
compelled to look for employment.
In accordance with this doctrine, the states bar aliens from
many other types of public employment. Thus, it is the common
thing today to require citizenship for school teachers." 4  In Okla-
homa, the heads of departments may not employ aliens "in any
way,"' 95 while in Florida all heads of departments must.give pref-
erence to citizens in any public employment,90 and in Montana
no alien may be employed by any public agency in any capacity,
"if competent American labor is available."19 T California provides
that aliens may not be employed in any governmental service, ex-
cept that declarants may teach school, and foreigners may be
employed in the universities, as specialists, or in case of emer-
gency.19 In New Jersey the civil service is open only to citizens,
except that declarants may be employed in state institutions, not
including penal or reformatory institutions, if a sufficient number
of qualified citizens is not available, and they may be employed
where unskilled or semi-skilled labor is needed under the same cir-
cumstances. 199
Another widely accepted exception to the general rule that
aliens have a right to work in the common callings of the com-
munity is found in connection with those in which the state has
a proprietary interest. This exception is akin to the principle in-
1941daho, Code Ann. 1932, sec. 32-1102 (citizen or declarant, but declarant
must complete citizenship within seven years); Michigan, Comp. Laws
1929, sec. 7620 (citizens or declarants) ; Montana, Rev. Code 1935, sec.
1088(1); Nevada, Comp Laws (Hillyer 1929) sees. 5986-5989 (citizens or
declarants) ; New Jersey, Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1930) sec. 185-106e(1);
New York, Consol. Laws (Cahill 1930), ch. 15, sec. 550(3) (citizen or
declarant, but declarant must complete citizenship within time prescribed
by law) ; South Dakota, Laws 1931, ch. 138, sec. 234; Tennessee, Code
1932, sec. 2513; Texas, Ann. Stat. (Vernon 1933) art. 2880a (citizen or
declarant, but no permanent certificate to be issued except to citizens.)
l95Oklahoma, Statutes 1931, sec. 3519.
l96Florida, Laws 1931, p. 1027.
'97Montana, Rev. Codes Supp. 1927, sec. 5653.
'98California, Gen. Laws (Deering, 1931) Act 285, secs. 1-4. Alien
teachers must take a special oath to support the institutions and policies
of the United States. California, Gen. Laws (Deering, 1931) Act 7519,
sec. 5.128. This was added in 1931.
199New Jersey, Comp. Stat., Supp. (1925-1930) sec. 144-153. Court
stenographers in Colorado, Laws 1925, ch. 159, and coal mine inspectors
in Colorado, Comp. Laws Supp. 1932, sec. 3455, must be citizens of the
Un;ted States.
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herent in the capacity of the state to refuse to employ aliens on
public works. In the leading case of Patsone v. Pcnnsyvania,2-
the Supreme Court sustained a statute which made it unlawful
for an alien to kill game, except in defense of person and prop-
erty, and which therefore made it illegal for an alien to possess
a shotgun or rifle. The case was decided on the general theory
that the state may reserve the common property of the state, such
as wild bird and animal life, fish and oysters, for the use of its
own citizens, the enjoyment of which it may deny to non-resi-
dents. 20 1 The state, Mr. Justice Holmes argued, has wide powers
of classification, and "a lack of abstract symmetry" does not mat-
ter. This is a matter of local experience, and this court, he asserted,
cannot say that the state is wrong.
There have been a number of similar cases in the state courts.
A Vermont statute denying a hunter's license to an alien has been
sustained on this theory, that since wild game is the common prop-
erty of the citizens of the state which the state may preserve for
their use under the police power, it is reasonable to make this dis-
tinction between resident citizens and resident aliens.20 1 By the
same token, state laws barring aliens from engaging in com-
mercial fishing in the waters of the state have been found to be
constitutional. 20 3 Accordingly, since the state may bar them alto-
gether, it has been held proper to require payment of a special
license tax bn the part of aliens in order to engage in commercial
fishing.204 Thus, also, the power of the state to forbid aliens to
own or possess firearms, without a written permit,20' or to own
weapons that may be concealed, 06 has been found to be within
the reasonable limits of the police power. In defense of this point
200(1914) 232 U. S. 138, 34 Sup. Ct. 281, 58 L. Ed. 539.
201Geer v. Connecticut; (1896) 161 U. S. 519, 16 Sup. Ct. 600, 40 L. Ed.
793; McCready v. Virginia, (1876) 94 U. S. 391, 24 L. Ed. 173; Lawton
v. Steele, (1894) 152 U. S. 133, 14 Sup. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 385; People v.
Lowndes, (1892) 130 N. Y. 455, 29 N. E. 751; Commonwealth v. Hilton,
(1899) 174 Mass. 29, 54 N. E. 362. Thus a state may tax nonresidents
and exempt residents, Haavik v. Alaska Packers Assoc., (1924) 263 U. S.
510, 44 Sup. Ct. 177, 68 L. Ed. 414.
20 2Bbndi v. Mackay, (1913) 87 Vt. 271, 89 Ati. 228, Ann. Cas. 1916C
130. 203Lubetich v. Pollock, (D.C. Wash. 1925) 6 F. (2d) 237; Alsos v.
Kendall, (1924) 111 Or. 359, 227 Pac. 286. The Oregon statute, Laws
1921, p. 156, as amended, Laws 1923, p. 478, prohibited aliens from engaging
in the business of catching salmon, whether as employer or employee.2 04Ex parte Gilletti, (1915) 70 Fla. 442, 70 So. 446; Curry v. Moran,
(1918) 76 Fla. 373, 79 So. 637.
205State v. Rheaume, (1922) 80 N. H. 319, 116 At. 758
2 06Ex parte Ramefiz, (1924) 193 Cal. 633, 226 Pac. 914.
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of view, it was argued that the legislature has grounds to believe
that aliens are more likely to use firearms unlawfully or un-
patriotically than citizens. A similar result was reached in the
upholding of a statute which exacted a special and rather high li-
cense fee ($20 a month) from aliens who work the gold mines of
a state."7
There have been no decisions running contrary to this great
weight of opinion. A federal circuit court once held a California
statute invalid which prohibited ineligible aliens from fishing in
the waters of the state, on the ground that while a state may bar
all aliens from fishing, it may not exclude certain classes of aliens
and extend the privilege to others.208 The Texas court held a
statute unconstitutional which prevented aliens from securing li-
censes to act as wholesale dealers in fish, arguing that there is
a difference between a discrimination in regard to the right to sell
fish after they are caught and have become private property, and
the right to take fish from the waters of the state.209 It is obvious
that these two cases do not deny the general rule which sanctions
exclusion.
Legislation excluding aliens from using the. natural resources
of the state which are considered the common property of its citi-
zens goes on apace. For example, among recent statutes one finds
that aliens may not be issued hunting or fishing licenses in several
states, 210 or they are required to pay a higher license fee than
citizens. 21 1 Recent statutes have been adopted which forbid aliens
to own firearms of any character.2 12 In Oregon, licenses for
water power projects may be issued only to citizens,213 In Nevada
2oTPeople v. Naglee, (1850) 1 Cal. 232, 52 Am. Dec. 312.
2OIn re Ah Chong, (C.C. Cal. 1880) 2 Fed. 733. The statute was
also held to contravene a treaty with the most favored nation clause.209Poon v. Miller, (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 234 S. W. 573.21OMassachusetts, Ann. Laws (Michie, 1933) ch. 131, sec. 74; New
Mexico, Laws 1921, ch. 113; New Mexico, Stat. Ann. 1929, sec. 57-401
to 406; Oregon, Code Ann. 1930, sec. 40-809 (aliens may not take oysters
from natural or artificial beds) ; Oregon, Code (Supp. 1935) sec. 40-511
(declarants who have resided in the United States five years may get
fishing licenses) ; Pennsylvania, Stats. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 30, sec. 240,
tit. 34, sec. 902; South Dakota, Laws 1921, ch. 243; West Virginia, Code
Ann. 1932, sec. 2218 (3).
"llOklahoma, Stats. 1931, sec. 4809.
21 2Massachusetts, Acts 1922, ch. 485, sec. 7 (aliens must have permit
to carry firearms); Nebraska, Comp. Stats. 1922, sec. 9836; New Mexico,
Stats. Ann. 1929, sec. 57-401 to 406; Oregon, Code Supp. 1935, sec.
72-202; West Virginia, Code Ann. 1932, sec. 6050(8).
218Oregon, Code Supp. 1935, sec. 47-2106(b). The Federal Power
Commission may issue licenses for construction and operation of water
power developments only to citizens. 41 Stat. at L. 1065, sec. 4(d).
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water appropriation certificates may be issued only to citizens,21"
and in Alaska prospectors must be citizens. 21' Only citizens may,
since 1931, purchase school lands in California.216
Similar legislation has been enacted by the states, presumably
on the same theory, in reference to public assistance. A good ex-
ample is found in the case of the current old age pension legisla-
tion. All the old age pension laws examined provide that the pen-
sioners be American citizens,21 and mnost of them require the
possession of citizenship for a period of fifteen years prior to the
granting of a pension.2 18  State aid to tubercular patients in Cali-
fornia,219 to the blind in Maryland,2 2 0 and to mothers in New
York221 now depends upon citizenship.
The right of the alien to own land may be considered here
briefly, inasmuch as it affects his chances of making a living in
agricultural pursuits. Originally, under the early common law,
aliens could not own land at all, -22 and since they could not take
land by operation of law, they could not transmit land by inheri-
tance.223  But this law of land ownership, coming down from very
214Nevada, Comp. Laws Supp. 1934, sec. 7957.2iSAlaska, Comp. Laws 1933, sec. 2267.
2a6California, Gen. Laws (Deering, 1931) Act 6287, sec. 1. Federal
public lands which have been withdrawn in connection with reclamation,
and which are no longer needed, may be sold to citizens only. 41 Stat. at
L. 606, ch. 192, sec. 2. So also, mineral lands belonging to the United
States are open to occupation by citizens and declarants only. 30 U. S. C. A.
sec. 22, Masons U. S. Code, tit. 30, sec. 22. Nonmetallic mineral deposits
on United States public lands are to be disposed of only to citizens. 41
Stat. at L. 437, ch. 85.
2Z7New Jersey, Laws 1931, ch. 219, sec. 2(c); New York, Consol.
Laws (Cahill 1930) ch. 49 2, sec. 123 (3); Oregon, Code Supp. 1935,
sec. 27-3701; Wisconsin, Stats., 1935, ch. 4922(2).
21SCalifornia, Gen. Laws (Deering, 1931) Act 5846, sec. 2(b) ; Idaho,
Code Ann. 1932, sec. 30-3105(b); Maryland, Code Ann. Supp. 1935,
art. 70A, sec. 3(2) ; Michigan, Compiled Laws Supp. 1933, sec. 8309-10(b);
Mason's Minn. 1927 Stats., 1936 Supp., sec. 3183-3(2); Nebraska, Com-
piled Laws Supp. 1933, sec. 68-205; New Hampshire, Laws 1931. ch. 165.
sec. 2(b); Ohio, General Code Ann. (Page 1935) sec. 1359-2(c); Utah.
Rev. Stats. Ann. 1933, sec. 19-21-3(1); West Virginia, Code Ann. 1932,
sec. 626(4); Wyoming, Rev. Stats. Ann. 1931, sec. 84-205(b).
219California, Gen. Laws (Deering 1931) Act 6258a, sec. 2.22OMaryland, Ann. Code Supp. 1935, art. 30, sec. 18.
22 New York, Consol. Laws (Cahill 1930) ch. 26, secs. 153(a),
157(2a).
2221 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law 442; 9 Holdsworth,
History of English Law 92.
223Blight v. Rochester, (1822) 7 Wheat. (U.S.) 535, 5 L. Ed. 516;
Moody v. Hagen, (1917) 36 N. D. 471, 162 N. W. 704, Ann. Cas. 1918A
933, L. R. A. 1918F 947, aff'd mem. (1917) 245 U. S. 633, 38 Sup. Ct.
133, 62 L. Ed. 522; Mager v. Grima, (1850) 8 How. (U.S.) 490, 12 L. Ed.
1168.
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early times, has been changed by treaty,224 statute, -2 and consti-
tutional provision, 228 the general result of which has been to give
aliens equal rights with citizens in connection with the ownership
of land. But in 1913, California started a retrogressive move-
ment in this field of law by passing a statute prohibiting aliens
ineligible to citizenship from owning land in the state,"' and other
states soon fell into line.2 28  In the leading case of Terrace v.
Thompson 219 decided in 1923, the Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of such legislation in upholding a Washington
statute which forbade any kind of legal or equitable ownership of
land by aliens other than those who in good faith have de-
clared their intention of becoming citizens, as against the claims
of an alien Japanese. The Court argued that, in the absence of
treaty provisions to the contrary, each state has the power to deny
aliens the right to own land within its borders, for not only was
an alien, under the common law, unable to acquire real property
by operation of the law, but the state also has, under its police
power, a wide discretionhry authority'to classify, since the equal
protection clause does not forbid the making of every distinction
between citizens and resident aliens. There is a substantial dif-
ference, it was maintained, between an alien and a citizen, and
also between a declarant and a nondeclarant, for the former has
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0rr v. Hodgson, (1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 453, 4 L. Ed. 613; Society
for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haveii, (1823) 8 Wheat. (U.S.)
464, 5 L. Ed. 662; Jackson v. Fitz Simmons, (1832) 10 Wend. (N.Y.) 9,
24 Am. Dec. 198.
225See, for example, New York, Laws 1897, ch. 593; Fay v. Taylor,
(1900) 31 Misc. Rep. 32, 63 N. Y. S. 572; Adams v. Akerlund, (1897)
168 Ill. 632, 48 N. E. 454; Duke of Richmond v. Milne's Executors, (1841)
17 La. 312, 36 Am. Dec. 613; 4 Moore, Int. Law Dig. 32. An alien declarant
may take land under the homestead laws, 26 Stat. at L. 1097, U. S. Comp.
Stat., (1916) sec. 4531. Most disabilities in England against aliens have
been abolished by statute. Statutes 33 & 34 Vict. ch. 14.
22GSee, for example, Wisconsin, constitution, art. I, sec. 15: "No
distinction shall ever be made by law between resident aliens and citizens,
in reference to the possession, enjoyment or descent of property."
2 27Alien Land Law of 1913, California, Codes & Gen. Laws (Deering
1915) sec. 40, as amended in 1920, Codes and Gen. Laws (Deering, Cons.
Supp. 1917-19) sec. 921. See Buell, California Land Laws (1923) 35
Poli. Sci. Q. 57; Comments, (1930) 3 So. Calif. L. Rev. 423, (1931) 19
Calif. L. Rev. 295.
228Washington, Laws 1921, ch. 50. See Freeman, The Rights of
Japanese and Chinese Aliens in Land in Washington, (1931) 6 Wash. L.
Rev. 127; Lanza, Some Effects of the Alien Land Act in Washington,
(1934) 8 Wash. L. Rev. 131. Texas, Gen. Laws 1921, ch. 134. See Ryan,
Rights of an Alien to Own Land in Texas, (1929) 7 Tex. L. Rev. 607.
Arizona, Laws 1921, ch. 29; Delaware, Laws 1921, ch. 188; Nebraska, Comp.
Stats. 1922, sec. 5687; New Mexico, Laws 1921, p. 469.
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renounced his allegiance to a foreign sovereign, and has declared
his intention of becoming an American citizen. That such a dis-
tinction exists is further reflected in the fact that some states have
given declarants the right to vote and hold office, and the United
States has subjected them to military service. Furthermore, the
distinction between aliens eligible for citizenship and those who
are ineligible is fixed by statutes of Congress, and thus establishes
a reasonable basis for so classifying them in state legislation.
Finally, this classification was sustained as a reasonable one, in
this particular situation. The statement of the court below was
quoted with approval: "It is obvious that one who is not a citizen
and cannot become one lacks an interest in, and the power to
effectually work for the welfare of, the state, and, so lacking, the
state may rightfully deny him the right to own and lease real
estate within its boundaries."
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And the Court went on to say: "The quality and allegiance of
those who own, occupy and use the farm lands within its borders
are matters of highest importance and affect the safety and power
of the State itself."231 Finally, it held that a treaty of commerce
which guaranteed the right "to carry on trade" did not include
the right to own, lease or have any other interest in land for
agricultural purposes.
Subsequent decisions of the Court reiterated and expanded the
scope of this doctrine. A California statute which prohibited
not only the ownership of land by ineligible aliens, but also the
leasing of land on a share-cropping contract basis was upheld on
the ground that a cropping contract is more than a mere contract
of employment.2 32  Similarly, the Supreme Court has sustained
statutes forbidding ineligible aliens to lease agricultural lands, "3
or to acquire stock in a corporation holding land for agricultural
purposes,23 4 for the state may prevent indirect as well as direct
forms of ownership.
2 2O(D.C. Wash. 1921) 274 Fed. 841, 849.
231(1923) 263 U. S. 197, 221, 44 Sup. Ct. 15, 68 L Ed. 255.
232Webb v. O'Brien, (1923) 263 U. S. 313, 44 Sup. Ct. 112, 68
L. Ed. 318.233Porterfield v. Webb, (1923) 263 U. S. 225, 44 Sup. Ct 21, 68
L. Ed. 278.234Frick v. Webb, (1923) 263 U. S. 326, 44 Sup. Ct 115, 68 L. Ed.
323. In Cockrill v. California, (1925) 268 U. S. 258, 45 Sup. Ct. 490, 69
L. Ed. 944. sec. 9 of the Calif. Alien Land Law, which provided that every
transfer of property to an ineligible alien was to be void and escheat to
the state, and that if any conveyance is made in which transaction an
ineligible alien puts up the money, a prima facie presumption arises of
intent to avoid escheat, was upheld. The Court ruled that the presumption is
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Thus, one may conclude that the states are not prevented by
the federal constitution from shutting aliens out of land owner-
ship, for apparently they can be denied the right to acquire any
interest in land, at least for agricultural purposes; they can there-
fore be forbidden to become farmers, if the states so desire. This
exclusion has been justified by a chain of reasoning which is not
altogether clear.23 The mere fact that federal laws distinguish
between citizens and aliens, and between declarants and nonde-
clarants, does not warrant using this classification for every other
purpose. The matter of classification should be decided with
reference to the particular ends any particular classification is de-
signed to achieve. This differentiation should be sustained only
on the ground that it promotes some public interest, and not merely
for the reason that for some unrelated purpose the same differentia-
tion is made. And it is not at all clear or obvious that nondeclarant
aliens lack an interest in the community, or are necessarily bad
farmers. To the contrary, there is reason to believe that the
true grievance against the Japanese or Chinese farmer on the
Pacific Coast is his ability to farm too competently.
IV. A WORD IN CONCLUSION
It is safe to conclude, from this survey of the alien's right
to work, that there is a strong tendency in the country to narrow
his economic opportunities. Under the stringencies of the depres-
sion, aliens as a class have been a convenient and rather helpless
target of discriminatory legislation. Nevertheless, a great deal
of this legislation has been in derogation of what we profess to
be the constitutional law of the land. This is not an abstract ques-
tion of the theoretically absolute sovereign. Under our dual sys-
tem of government, and with our theory of written constitutions
as limitations on governmental power, no governmental unit in
the United States possesses power in the absolute sense. As Mr.
Justice Matthews wrote, speaking for a unanimous court in Yick
Wo v. Hopkins,
2 36
"Sovereignty itself, is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the
author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign
powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty
not fanciful or arbitrary, and that this rule of evidence is based upon a
reasonable classification.
235For a biting criticism of the Alien Land Cases, see Powell, Alien
Land Cases in United States Supreme Court, (1924) 12 Calif. L. Rev. 259.
286(1886) 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220.
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itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all gov-
ernment exists and acts. And the law is the definition and limita-
tion of power .... The fundamental rights to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions,
are secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are the
monuments showing the victorious progress of the race in secur-
ing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of just
and equal laws .... "
Even though it may be conceded that in the field of foreign
relations the federal government possesses great authority, never-
theless it is clear that it is a government of limited powers, re-
stricted to the exercise of those powers which are delegated to it.
Even its power of deportation is limited to the extent that it may
not invade the reserved governmental powers of the states.2 3 ' Most
of the legislation, as a matter of fact, which discriminates against
aliens, has emanated from the states, for the regulation of ordinary
trades and callings is largely within the jurisdiction of the states.
As against such legislation, the chief constitutional protection of
the alien is the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Measured by the terms of the fourteenth amendment, it
would appear that much of the recent legislation, hitherto untested
in the courts, might prove to be inconsistent with our fundamental
law. For, while the power of classification is necessarily very
great, and, in the words of the Supreme Court, is "the most in-
veterate of our reasoning processes," nevertheless, "it must regard
real resemblances and real differences between things and persons,
and class them in accordance with their pertinence to the purpose
in hand."'28
It is no defense of the drift of American policy to say that
other nations treat their aliens shabbily.23 9 The fact is that the
civilized world has been trying to get away from narrow, tribal
manifestations of nationalism such as are illustrated here. In
article XXIII of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the mem-
ber states agree "to secure and maintain freedom of communica-
tions and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of
all members of the League." The well-attended International Con-
ference on the Treatment of Foreigners, held in Paris late in the
237Keller v. United States, (1909) 213 U. S. 138, 29 Sup. Ct. 470,
53 L. Ed. 737.
238Truax v. Corrigan, (1921) 257 U. S. 312, 337, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66
L. Ed. 254.
239See Preuss, The Position of Aliens in National Socialist Penal Law
Reform, (1935) 29 Am. J. Int. L. 206; Zaitzeff, The Legal Position of
Foreigners in Soviet Russia, (1926) 24 Mich. L. Rev. 441.
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year 1929, emphasized the more advanced concept of modern
times, that foreigners ought to be permitted to conduct commercial
transactions of every kind, to pursue all occupations except public
functions, and to acquire and dispose of land, freely and without
discrimination.2 4 0  Such is the aspiration, at least, of a truly
modem civilization.
240See Kuhn, The International Conference on the Treatment of
Foreigners, (1930) 24 Am. J. Int. L. 570; Cutler, The Treatment of
Foreigners, (1933) 27 Am. J. Int. L. 225.
